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Abstract. We consider a specific class of tree structures that can represent basic struc-
tures in linguistics and computer science such as XML documents, parse trees, and tree-
banks, namely, finite node-labeled sibling-ordered trees. We present axiomatizations of
the monadic second-order logic (MSO), monadic transitive closure logic (FO(TC1)) and
monadic least fixed-point logic (FO(LFP1)) theories of this class of structures. These logics
can express important properties such as reachability. Using model-theoretic techniques,
we show by a uniform argument that these axiomatizations are complete, i.e., each formula
that is valid on all finite trees is provable using our axioms. As a backdrop to our positive
results, on arbitrary structures, the logics that we study are known to be non-recursively
axiomatizable.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we develop a uniform method for obtaining complete axiomatizations of
fragments of MSO on finite trees. In particular, we obtain a complete axiomatization
for MSO, FO(TC1), and FO(LFP1) on finite node-labeled sibling-ordered trees. We take
inspiration from Kees Doets, who proposed in [12] complete axiomatizations of FO-theories
in particular on the class of node-labeled finite trees without sibling-order (see Section 4,
where we discuss his work in more details). A similar result for FO on node-labeled finite
trees with sibling order was shown in [2] in the context of model-theoretic syntax and in [9]
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in the context of XML query languages. We use the signature of [9] and extend the set of
axioms proposed there to match the richer syntax of the logics we consider.
Finite trees are basic and ubiquitous structures that are of interest at least to math-
ematicians, computer scientists (e.g. tree-structured documents) and linguists (e.g. parse
trees). The logics we study are known to be very well-behaved on this particular class of
structures and to have an interestingly high expressive power. In particular, they all allow
to express reachability, but at the same time, they have the advantage of being decidable
on trees.
As XML documents are tree-structured data, our results are relevant to XML query
languages. Declarative query languages fro both relational and XML data are based on
logical languages. In [11] and [16], MSO and FO(TC1) have been proposed as a yardstick
of expressivity of navigational query languages for XML. It is known that FO(LFP1) has
the same expressive power as MSO on trees, but the translations between the two are non-
trivial, and hence it is not clear whether an axiomatization for one language can be obtained
from an axiomatization for the other language in any straightforward way. One important
and well-studied problem for XML query languages, as well as for database query languages
in general, is query optimization. Typically, a query can be expressed in many equivalent
ways, and the execution time of a query depends strongly on the way it is expressed. A
common approach to database query optimization is by means of a set of rewrite rules,
allowing one to transform a query expression into another equivalent one, together with a
cost model that predicts the execution time of a query expression on a given database [1].
In [10], a sound and complete set of rewrite rules for the XML path language Core XPath
2.0 was obtained from a complete axiomatization of the first-order theory of finite trees,
exploiting the fact that Core XPath 2.0 is expressively complete for first-order logic. We
expect that the results we present here can be used in order to obtain sound and complete
sets of rewrite rules for dialects of Core XPath that are expressively complete for FO(TC1)
and for MSO, such as the ones presented in [7, 11].
In applications to computational linguistics, finite trees are used to represent the gram-
matical structure of natural language sentences. In the context of model theoretic syntax,
Rogers advocates in [27] the use of MSO in order to characterize derivation trees of context
free grammars. Kepser also argues in [21] that MSO should be used in order to query
treebanks. A treebank is a text corpus in which each sentence has been annotated with
its syntactic structure (represented as a tree structure). In [22] and [30] Kepser and Tiede
propose to consider various transitive closure logics, among which FO(TC1), arguing that
they constitute very natural formalisms from the logical point of view, allowing concise and
intuitive phrasing of parse tree properties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the concept
of finite tree and the logics we are interested in together with their standard interpreta-
tion. Section 3 merely state our three axiomatizations. In Section 4, we introduce non
standard semantics called Henkin semantics for which our axiomatizations are easily seen
to be complete. We prove in detail the FO(LFP1) Henkin completeness proof. Section 5
introduces operations on Henkin structures: substructure formation and a general operation
of Henkin structures combination. We obtain Feferman-Vaught theorems for this operation
by means of Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games. This section contains in particular the definitions
and adequacy proofs of the Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games that we also use there to prove our
Feferman-Vaught theorems. In Section 6, we prove real completeness (that is, on the more
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restricted class of finite trees). For that purpose, we consider substructures of trees that we
call forests and use the general operation discussed in Section 5 to combine a set of forests
into one new forest. Our Feferman-Vaught theorems apply to such constructions and we
use them in our main proof of completeness, showing that no formula of our language can
distinguish Henkin models of our axioms from real finite trees. We also point out that
every standard model of our axioms actually is a finite tree. Finally, we notice in Section 7
that a simplified version of our method can be used to show similar results for the class of
node-labeled finite linear orders.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Finite Trees. A tree is a partially ordered set with a unique element called the root
and such that apart from the root, each element (or node) has one unique immediate
predecessor. We are interested in finite node-labeled sibling-ordered trees: finite trees in
which the children of each node are linearly ordered. Also, the nodes can be labeled by
unary predicates. We will call these structures finite trees for short.
Definition 2.1 (Finite tree). Let {P1, . . . , Pn} be a fixed finite set of unary predicate
symbols. By a finite tree, we mean a finite structure M = (M,<,≺, P1, . . . , Pn), where
(M,<) is a tree (with < the descendant relation) and ≺ linearly orders the children of each
node.
2.2. Three Extensions of First-Order Logic. In this section, we introduce three exten-
sions of FO: MSO, FO(TC1) and FO(LFP1). In the remainder of the paper (unless explicitly
stated otherwise), we will always be working with a fixed purely relational vocabulary σ (i.e.
with no individual constant or function symbols) and hence, with σ-structures. We assume
as usual that we have a countably infinite set of first-order variables. In the case of MSO
and FO(LFP1), we also assume that we have a countably infinite set of set variables. The
semantics defined in this section we will refer to as standard semantics and the associated
structures, as standard structures.
We first introduce monadic second order logic, MSO, which is the extension of first-order
logic in which we can quantify over the subsets of the domain.
Definition 2.2 (Syntax and semantics of MSO). Let At stand for a first-order atomic
formula (of the form R(~x)), x = y, or ⊤), x a first-order variable and X a set variable. The
set of MSO formulas is given by the following recursive definition:
ϕ := At | Xx | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ¬ϕ | ∃x ϕ | ∃X ϕ
We use ∀Xϕ (resp. ∀xϕ) as shorthand for ¬∃X¬ϕ (resp. ¬∃x¬ϕ). We define the quan-
tifier depth of a MSO formula as the maximal number of first-order and second-order nested
quantifiers. We interpret MSO formulas in first-order structures. Like for FO formulas, the
truth of MSO formulas in M is defined modulo a valuation g of variables as objects. But
here, we also have set variables, to which g assigns subsets of the domain. We let g[a/x]
be the assignment which differs from g only in assigning a to x (similarly for g[A/X]). The
truth of atomic formulas is defined by the usual FO clauses plus the following:
M, g |= Xx iff g(x) ∈ g(X) for X a set variable
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The truth of compound formulas is defined by induction, with the same clauses as in
FO and an additional one:
M, g |= ∃Xϕ iff there is A ⊆M such that M, g[A/X] |= ϕ
The second logic we are interested in is monadic transitive closure logic, FO(TC1), which
extends FO by closing it under the transitive closure of binary definable relations.
Definition 2.3 (Syntax and semantics of FO(TC1)). Let At stand for a first-order atomic
formula (of the form R(~x)), x = y, or ⊤), u, v, x, y first-order variables and ϕ(x, y) a
FO(TC1) formula (which, besides x and y, possibly contains other free variables). The set
of FO(TC1) formulas is given by the following recursive definition:
ϕ := At | Xx | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ¬ϕ | ∃x ϕ | [TCxyϕ(x, y)](u, v)
We use ∀xϕ as shorthand for ¬∃x¬ϕ. We define the quantifier depth of a FO(TC1) formula
as the maximal number of nested first-order quantifiers and TC operators. We interpret
FO(TC1) formulas in first-order structures. The notion of assignment and the truth of atomic
formulas is defined as in FO. The truth of compound formulas is defined by induction, with
the same clauses as in FO and an additional one:
M, g |= [TCxyϕ](u, v)
iff
for all A ⊆M , if g(u) ∈ A
and for all a, b ∈M , a ∈ A and M, g[a/x, b/y] |= ϕ(x, y) implies b ∈ A,
then g(v) ∈ A.
Proposition 2.4. On standard structures, the following semantical clause for the TC op-
erator is equivalent to the one given above:
M, g |= [TCxyϕ(x, y)](u, v)
iff
there exist a1 . . . an ∈M with g(u) = a1 and g(v) = an
and M, g |= ϕ(ai, ai+1) for all 0 < i < n
Proof. Indeed, suppose there is a finite sequence of points a1 . . . an such that g(u) = a1,
g(v) = an, and for each i < n, M, g[x/ai; y/ai+1] |= ϕ(x, y). Then for any subset A closed
under ϕ and containing a1, we can show by induction on the length of the sequence a1 . . . an
that an belongs to A. Now, on the other hand, suppose that there is no finite sequence like
described above. To show that there is a subset A of the required form, we simply take
A to be the set of all points that can be reached from u via ϕ by a finite sequence. By
assumption, v does not belong to this set and the set is closed under ϕ.
Intuitively this means that for a formula of the form [TCxyϕ](u, v) to hold on a standard
structure, there must be a finite “ϕ path” between the points that are named by the variables
u and v.
Finally we will also be interested in monadic least fixed-point logic FO(LFP1), which
extends FO with set variables and an explicit monadic least fixed point operator. Consider
a FO(LFP1)-formula ϕ(X,x) and a structure M together with a valuation g. This formula
induces an operator Fϕ taking a set A ⊆ dom(M) to the set {a : M, g[a/x,A/X] |= ϕ}.
FO(LFP1) is concerned with least fixed points of such operators. If ϕ is positive in X
(a formula is positive in X whenever X only occurs in the scope of an even number of
negations), the operator Fϕ is monotone (i.e. X ⊆ Y implies Fϕ(X) ⊆ Fϕ(Y )). Monotone
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operators always have a least fixed point LFP (F ) =
⋂
{X|F (X) ⊆ X} (defined as the
intersection of all their prefixed points).
Definition 2.5 (Syntax and semantics of FO(LFP1)). Let At stand for a first-order atomic
formula (of the form R(~x)), x = y, or ⊤), X a set variable, x, y FO-variables, ψ, ξ FO(LFP1)-
formulas and ϕ(x,X) a FO(LFP1)-formula positive in X (besides x and X, ϕ(x,X) possibly
contains other free variables). The set of FO(LFP1) formulas is given by the following
recursive definition:
ψ := At | Xy | ψ ∧ ξ | ψ ∨ ξ | ψ → ξ | ¬ψ | ∃x ψ | [LFPXxϕ(x,X)]y
We use ∀xψ as shorthand for ¬∃x¬ψ. We define the quantifier depth of a FO(LFP1)-formula
as the maximal number of nested first-order quantifiers and LFP operators. Again, we can
interpret FO(LFP1)-formulas in first-order structures. The notion of assignment and the
truth of atomic formulas are defined similarly as in the MSO case. The truth of compound
formulas is defined by induction, with the same clauses as in FO and an additional one:
M, g |= [LFPXxϕ]y
iff
for all A ⊆ dom(M), if for all a ∈ dom(M), M, g[a/x,A/X] |= ϕ(x,X) implies a ∈ A,
then g(y) ∈ A.
Remark 2.6. In practice we will use an equivalent (less intuitive but often more convenient)
rephrasing:
M, g |= [LFPXxϕ]y
iff
for all A ⊆ dom(M), if g(y) /∈ A,
then there exists a ∈ dom(M) such that a /∈ A and M, g[a/x,A/X] |= ϕ(x,X).
2.3. Expressive Power. There is a recursive procedure, transforming any FO(LFP1)-
formula ϕ into a MSO-formula ϕ′ such that M, g |= ϕ iff M, g |= ϕ′. The interesting
clause is ([LFPXxϕ(x,X)]y)
′ = ∀X(∀x(ϕ(x,X)′ → Xx)→ Xy). (The other ones are all of
the same type, e.g. (ϕ ∧ ψ)′ = (ϕ′ ∧ ψ′).) This procedure can easily be seen adequate by
considering the semantical clause for the LFP operator.
Now there is also a recursive procedure transforming any FO(TC1) formula ϕ into
a FO(LFP1) formula ϕ′′ such that M, g |= ϕ iff M, g |= ϕ′′. The interesting clause is
([TCxyϕ](u, v))
′′ = [LFPXyy = u∨∃x((Xx∧ϕ(x, y)
′′))]v. Let us give an argument for this
claim. By Proposition 2.4 it is enough to show that [LFPXyy = u∨∃x(Xx∧ϕ(x, y)
′′)]v holds
if and only if there is a finite ϕ′′ path from u to v. For the right to left direction, suppose there
is such a path a1 . . . an with g(u) = a1 and g(v) = an. Then, for any subset A of the domain,
we can show by induction on i that if for all ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n), ai = u ∨ ∃x((Ax ∧ ϕ(x, ai)
′′)
implies ai ∈ A, then v ∈ A, i.e., [LFPXyy = u ∨ ∃x((Xx ∧ ϕ(x, y)
′′))]v holds. Now for the
left to right direction, suppose there is no such ϕ′′ path. Consider the set A of all points
that can be reached from u by a finite ϕ′′ path. By assumption, ¬Av and it holds that
∀y((y = u ∨ ∃x(Ax ∧ ϕ(x, y)′′))→ Ay), i.e., ¬[LFPXyy = u ∨ ∃x(Xx ∧ ϕ(x, y)
′′)]v.
It is known that on arbitrary structures FO(TC1) < FO(LFP1) < MSO (see [13] or [24])
and on trees FO(TC1) <trees FO(LFP1) =trees MSO (see [11] and [28]). It is also known
that the (not FO definable) class of finite trees is already definable in FO(TC1) (see for
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instance [22]), which is the weakest of the logics studied here. We provide additional detail
in Section 6.3.
3. The Axiomatizations
FO1. ⊢ φ, whenever φ is a propositional tautology
FO2. ⊢ ∀xϕ→ ϕxt , where t is substitutable for x in ϕ
FO3. ⊢ ∀x(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ)
FO4. ⊢ ϕ→ ∀xϕ, where x does not occur free in ϕ
FO5. ⊢ x = x
FO6. ⊢ x = y → (ϕ→ ψ), where ϕ is atomic and ψ is obtained
from ϕ by replacing x in zero or more (but not necessarily
all) places by y.
Modus Ponens if ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, then ⊢ ψ
FO Generalization if ⊢ ϕ, then ⊢ ∀xϕ
Figure 1: Axioms and rules of FO
COMP. ⊢ ∃X∀x(Xx↔ ϕ), where X does not occur free in ϕ
MSO1. ⊢ ∀Xϕ→ ϕ[X/T ], where T (which is either a set variable
or a set predicate) is substitutable in ϕ for X.
MSO2. ⊢ ∀X(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀Xϕ→ ∀Xψ)
MSO3. ⊢ ϕ→ ∀Xϕ, where X does not occur free in ϕ
MSO Generalization if ⊢ ϕ, then ⊢ ∀Xϕ
Figure 2: Axioms and inference rule of MSO
FO(TC1) ⊢ [TCxyϕ](u, v) → ((ψ(u) ∧ ∀x∀y(ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x, y)→ ψ(y)))→ ψ(v))
axiom where ψ is any FO(TC1) formula
FO(TC1) if ⊢ ξ → ((P (u) ∧ ∀x∀y(P (x) ∧ ϕ(x, y)→ P (y)))→ P (v)),
Genera- and P does not occur in ξ,
lization then ⊢ ξ → [TCxyϕ](u, v)
Figure 3: Axiom and inference rule of FO(TC1)
As many arguments in this paper equally hold for MSO, FO(TC1) and FO(LFP1), we
let Λ ∈ {MSO,FO(TC1),FO(LFP1)} and use Λ as a symbol for any one of them. The
axiomatization of Λ on finite trees consists of three parts: the axioms of first-order logic,
the specific axioms of Λ, and the specific axioms on finite trees.
To axiomatize FO, we adopt the infinite set of logical axioms and the two rules of
inference given in Figure 1 (like in [14], except from the fact that we use a generalization
rule). Here, as in [14], by a propositional tautology, we mean a formula can be obtained
from a valid propositional formula (also known as the sentential calculus) by uniformly
substituting formulas for the proposition letters). Alternatively, FO1 may be replaced by
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FO(LFP1) ⊢ [LFPXxϕ]y → (∀x(ϕ(x, ψ) → ψ(x))→ ψ(y))
axiom where ψ is any FO(LFP1) formula and ϕ(x, ψ) is the result
of the replacement in ϕ(x,X) of each occurrence of X by ψ
(renaming variables when needed)
FO(LFP1) if ⊢ ξ → (∀x(ϕ(x, P )→ P (x))→ P (y)),
Generalization and P positive in ϕ does not occur in ξ,
then ⊢ ξ → [LFPXxϕ](y)
Figure 4: Axiom and inference rule of FO(LFP1)
T1. ∀x∀y∀z(x < y ∧ y < z → x < z) < is transitive
T2. ¬∃x(x < x) < is irreflexive
T3. ∀x∀y(x < y → ∃z(x <ch z ∧ z ≤ y)) immediate child
T4. ∃x∀y(x ≤ y) there is a unique root
T5. ∀x∀y∀z(x < z ∧ y < z → x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x) linearly ordered branches
T6. ∀x∀y∀z(x ≺ y ∧ y ≺ z → x ≺ z) ≺ is transitive
T7. ¬∃x(x ≺ x) ≺ is irreflexive
T8. ∀x∀y(x ≺ y → ∃z(x ≺ns z ∧ z  y)) immediate next sibling
T9. ∀x∃y(y  x ∧ ¬∃z(z ≺ y)) there is a least sibling
T10. ∀x∀y((x ≺ y ∨ y ≺ x)↔ (∃z(z <ch x ∧ z <ch y) ∧ x 6= y)) linearly ordered siblings
Ind. ∀x(∀y((x < y ∨ x ≺ y)→ ϕ(y))→ ϕ(x))→ ∀xϕ(x) induction scheme
where
ϕ(x) ranges over Λ-formulas in one free variable x,
and
x <ch y is shorthand for x < y ∧ ¬∃z(z < y ∧ x < z),
x ≺ns y is shorthand for x ≺ y ∧ ¬∃z(x ≺ z ∧ z ≺ y)
Figure 5: Specific axioms on finite trees
a complete set of axioms for propositional logic. To axiomatize MSO, the axioms and
rule of Figure 2 are added to the axiomatization of FO and we call the resulting system
⊢MSO. COMP stands for “comprehension” by analogy with the comprehension axiom of set
theory. MSO1 plays a similar role as FO2, MSO2 as FO3 and MSO3 as FO4. To axiomatize
FO(TC1), the axiom and rule of Figure 3 are added to the axiomatization of FO and we
call the resulting system ⊢FO(TC1). To axiomatize FO(LFP1), the axiom and rule of Figure
4 are added to the axiomatization of FO and we call the resulting system ⊢FO(LFP1). We
are interested in axiomatizing Λ on the class of finite trees. For that purpose, we restrict
the class of considered structures by adding to ⊢Λ the axioms given in Figure 5 and we call
the resulting system ⊢treeΛ . Note that the induction scheme in Figure 5 allows to reason by
induction on properties definable in Λ only.
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Proposition 3.1. A finite structure M = (M,<,≺, P1, . . . , Pn) satisfies the axioms T1–
T10 if and only if M is a finite tree.
Proof. It follows from the truth of T1, T2 and T5 that (M,<) is a tree. Note that T3 and
T4 are valid consequences of T1, T2, T5 on finite structures. Furthermore, T6, T7 and
T10 imply that ≺ linearly orders the children of each node (and that ≺ only relates to each
other nodes that are siblings). Note again that T8 and T9 follow from T6, T7 and T10 on
finite structures.
In fact, as we will see later, cf. Theorem 6.7, the axioms T1–T10, together with the
induction scheme Ind for Λ-formulas (where Λ ∈ {MSO,FO(TC1),FO(LFP1)}) define the
class of finite trees.
We refer for basic definitions (e.g., proof by which we mean formal deduction, or axiom-
atization by which we mean deductive calculus) to [14] and sometimes only sketch or even
omit classical arguments. E.g., we assume the notion of being substitutable in a formula to
be clear for both objects and set variables. For details on such basic notions and technics,
we refer to the material extensively developed in [14] and in particular, to the proof of the
FO completeness theorem presented there. The Henkin completeness proofs provided in
Section 4 are built on this classical material.
We end this Section by spelling out some definitions that are specific to our paper.
Definition 3.2. We say that a Λ-formula ϕ is Λ-provable if ⊢Λ ϕ occurs (as the last line)
in some Λ-proof and we say that it is Λ-consistent if its negation is not Λ-provable.
Let Γ be a set of Λ-formulas and ϕ a Λ-formula. By Γ ⊢Λ ϕ we will always mean that
there are ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ such that ⊢Λ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn) → ϕ. Whenever Γ ⊢Λ ¬ϕ does not
hold, we say that ϕ is Γ-consistent. We say that Γ is Λ-consistent if ⊤ is Γ-consistent.
Finally, we say that Γ is a maximal consistent set of Λ-formulas if Γ is consistent, and for
each formula φ ∈ Λ, either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ.
Now the main result of this paper is that on standard structures, the Λ theory of finite
trees is completely axiomatized by ⊢treeΛ . In the remaining sections we will progressively
build a proof of it.
4. Henkin Completeness
As it is well known, MSO, FO(TC1) and FO(LFP1) are highly undecidable on arbitrary
standard structures and hence not recursively enumerable (by arbitrary, we mean when
there is no restriction on the interpretation of the relation symbols from the signature,
unlike in the case of, e.g., trees). So in order to show that our axiomatizations ⊢treeΛ are
complete on finite trees, we refine a trick used by Kees Doets in his PhD thesis [12]. We
proceed in two steps (the second step being the one inspired by Kees Doets). First, we
show completeness theorems, based on a non-standard (so called Henkin) semantics for
MSO, FO(TC1) and FO(LFP1) (on the general topic of Henkin semantics, see [18], the
original paper by Henkin and also [26]). Each semantics respectively extends the class of
standard structures with non standard (Henkin) MSO, FO(TC1) and FO(LFP1)-structures.
By the Henkin completeness theorems, our axiomatic systems ⊢treeΛ naturally turn out to be
complete on the wider class of their Henkin-models. But we will see that compactness also
follows from these completeness results and some of these Henkin models are infinite. As a
second step, we show in Section 6 that no Λ-sentence can distinguish between standard and
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non-standard Λ-Henkin-models among models of our axioms. Every finite Henkin model
being also a standard model, this entails that our axioms are complete on the class of
(standard) finite trees, i.e., each Λ-sentence valid on this class is provable using the system
⊢treeΛ .
Now let us point out that Kees Doets was interested in complete axiomatizations of
monadic “Π11-theories” of various classes of linear orders and trees. Considering such theories
in fact amounts to considering first-order theories of such structures extended with finitely
many unary predicates. Thus, he was relying on the FO completeness theorem and if he was
working with non-standard models of particular FO-theories, he was not concerned with
non standard Henkin-structures in our sense. In particular, he used Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´
games in order to show that “definably well-founded” node-labeled trees have well-founded
n-equivalents for all n. In Section 6.2, Lemma 6.4, which is the key lemma to our main
completeness result, establishes a similar result for definably well-founded Henkin-models
of the Λ-theory of finite node-labeled sibling-ordered finite trees. Hence, what makes the
originality of the method developed in this paper is its use of Henkin semantics: we first
create a Henkin model and then “massage” it in order to obtain a model that is among our
intended ones. Similar methods are commonly used to show completeness results in modal
logic, where “canonical models” are often transformed in order to obtain intended models
(see [3]). Remarkably, the completeness proof for the µ-calculus on finite trees given in
[8], which is directly inspired by the methods used here, proceeds in that way. There are
numerous examples of that sort in modal logic (and especially, in temporal logic), but there
is also one notable example in classical model theory. In 1970, Keisler provided a complete
axiomatization of FO extended with the quantifier “there exist uncountably many” (see
[20]). His completeness proof, which is established for standard models, is surprisingly
simple, it relies on the construction of an elementary chain of Henkin structures and then
uses the omitting types theorem. Hence all in all, these structures seem to provide a
particularly convenient tool, not only for simple Henkin completeness proofs, but also for
more refined completeness proofs with respect to interesting subclasses of Henkin models
like standard models.
Let us now introduce Henkin structures formally. Such structures are particular cases
among structures called frames (note that such frames are unrelated to “Kripke frames”)
and it is convenient to define frames before defining Henkin-structures. In our case, a frame
is simply a relational structure together with some subset of the powerset of its domain
called its set of admissible subsets. A Henkin structure is a frame whose set of admissible
subsets satisfies some natural closure conditions.
Definition 4.1 (Frames). Let σ be a purely relational vocabulary. A σ-frame M consists
of a non-empty domain dom(M), an interpretation in dom(M) of the predicates in σ and a
set of admissible subsets AM ⊆ ℘(dom(M)).
Whenever AM = ℘(dom(M)), M can be identified to a standard structure. Assignments
g into M are defined as in standard semantics, except that if X is a set variable, then we
require that g(X) ∈ AM.
Definition 4.2 (Interpretation of Λ-formulas in frames). Λ-formulas are interpreted in
frames as in standard structures, except for the three following clauses. The set quantifier
clause of MSO becomes:
M, g |= ∃Xϕ iff there is A ∈ AM such that M, g[A/X] |= ϕ
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The TC clause of FO(TC1) becomes:
M, g |= [TCxyϕ](u, v)
iff
for all A ∈ AM, if g(u) ∈ A
and for all a, b ∈ dom(M), a ∈ A and M, g[x/a, b/y] |= ϕ imply b ∈ A,
then g(v) ∈ A.
And finally the LFP clause of FO(LFP1) becomes:
M, g |= [LFPXxϕ]y
iff
for all A ∈ AM, if for all a ∈ dom(M), M, g[a/x,A/X] |= ϕ(x,X) implies a ∈ A,
then g(y) ∈ A.
Definition 4.3 (Λ-Henkin-Structures). A Λ-Henkin-structure is a frameM that is closed
under parametric Λ-definability, i.e., for each Λ-formula ϕ and assignment g into M:
{a ∈M | M, g[a/x] |= ϕ} ∈ AM
We call a Λ-Henkin-structure M standard whenever every subset in dom(M) belongs to
AM.
Remark 4.4. Note that any finite Λ-Henkin-structure is a standard structure, as every
subset of the domain is parametrically definable in a finite structure. Hence, non standard
Henkin structures are always infinite. ⊣
Theorem 4.5. Λ is completely axiomatized on Λ-Henkin-structures by ⊢Λ, in fact for every
set of Λ-formulas Γ and Λ-formula ϕ, ϕ is true in all Λ-Henkin-models of Γ if and only if
Γ ⊢Λ ϕ.
We do not detail here the MSO proof, as it is a special case of the proof of completeness
for the theory of types given in [26]. We focus only on the FO(LFP1) case, as the FO(TC1)
case is very similar, except that there is no need to consider set variables. Up to now we
have been working with purely relational vocabularies. Here we will be using individual
constants in the standard way, but only for the sake of readability (we could dispense with
them and use FO variables instead). Also, whenever this is clear from the context, we
will use ⊢ as shorthand for ⊢FO(LFP1). Let us now begin the Henkin completeness proof for
FO(LFP1). This will achieve the proof of Theorem 4.5.
Lemma 4.6 (Generalization Lemma for FO Quantifiers). If Γ ⊢FO(LFP1) ϕ and x does not
occur free in Γ, then Γ ⊢FO(LFP1) ∀xϕ.
Proof. We refer the reader to the proof for FO given by Enderton in [14, page 117]. The
same proof applies for FO(LFP1) (as well as MSO and FO(TC1)).
Definition 4.7. We say that a set of FO(LFP1) formulas ∆ contains FO(LFP1) Henkin
witnesses if and only if the two following conditions hold. First, for every formula ϕ, if
¬∀xϕ ∈ ∆, then ¬ϕ[x/t] ∈ ∆ for some term t and if ¬[LFPXxϕ]y ∈ ∆, then ¬Py ∧
¬∃x(¬Px ∧ ϕ(P, x)) ∈ ∆ for some monadic predicate P . Second, if ϕ ∈ ∆ and x is a free
variable of ϕ, then ∀x(Px↔ ϕ(x)) ∈ ∆ for some monadic predicate P .
The originality of the FO(LFP1) case essentially lies in the notion of FO(LFP1)-Henkin
witness of Definition 4.7. In order to use this notion in the proof of Lemma 4.9, we also
need the following lemma:
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Lemma 4.8. Let Γ be a consistent set of FO(LFP1)-formulas and θ a FO(LFP1)-formula
of the form ∀x(ϕ↔ Px) with P a fresh monadic predicate (i.e. not appearing in Γ). Then
Γ ∪ {θ} is also consistent.
Proof. Suppose Γ∪{∀x(ϕ↔ Px)} is inconsistent, so there is some proof of ⊥ from formulas
in Γ∪{∀x(ϕ↔ Px)}. We first rename all bound variables in the proof with variables which
had no occurrence in the proof or in ∀x(ϕ ↔ Px) (this is possible since proofs are finite
objects and we have a countable stock of variables). Also, whenever in the proof the
FO(LFP1) generalization rule is applied on some unary predicate P , we make sure that this
P is different from the unary predicate that we want to substitute by ϕ and which does
not appear in the proof; this is always possible because we have a countable set of unary
predicates. Now, we replace in the proof all occurrences of Px by ϕ (as we renamed bound
variables, there is no accidental binding of variables by wrong quantifiers). Then, every
occurrence of ∀x(ϕ↔ Px) in the proof becomes an occurrence of ∀x(ϕ↔ ϕ), i.e., we have
obtained a proof of ⊥ from Γ ∪ {∀x(ϕ ↔ ϕ)}, i.e., from Γ (∀x(ϕ ↔ ϕ) is provable, as it
can be obtained by FO generalization from a propositional tautology). It entails that Γ is
already inconsistent, which contradicts the consistency of Γ. Now it remains to show that
the replacement procedure of all occurrences of Px by ϕ is correct, so that we still have a
proof of ⊥ after it. Every time the replacement occurs in an axiom (or its generalization,
which is still an axiom as we defined it), then the result is still an instance of the given axiom
schema (even for FO(LFP1) generalizations, because we took care that P is never used in
the proof for a FO(LFP1) generalization). Also, as replacement is applied uniformly in the
proof, every application of modus ponens stays correct: consider ψ → ξ and ψ. Obviously
the result ψ∗ of the substitution will allow to derive the result ξ∗ of the substitution from
ψ∗ → ξ∗ and ψ∗. Also ⊥∗ is simply ⊥, so the procedure gives us a proof of ⊥.
Lemma 4.9. (FO(LFP1) Lindenbaum Lemma) Let σ be a countable vocabulary and let
σ∗ = σ ∪ {cn | ∈ N} ∪ {Pn | n ∈ N} with ci, Pi /∈ σ. If a set Γ of FO(LFP1)-formulas
in vocabulary σ is consistent, then there exists a maximal consistent set Γ∗ of σ∗ formulas
such that Γ ⊆ Γ∗ and Γ∗ contains FO(LFP1)-Henkin witnesses.
Proof. Let Γ be a consistent set of well formed FO(LFP1)-formulas in a countable vocabulary
σ. We expand σ to σ∗ by adding countably many new constants and countably many new
monadic predicates. Then Γ remains consistent as a set of well formed formulas in the
new language. We fix an enumeration of all tuples consisting of two FO variables, one set
variable and one formula of σ∗:
< ϕ1, x1, x
′
1,X1 >,< ϕ2, x2, x
′
2,X2 >,< ϕ3, x3, x
′
3,X3 >, . . .
(this is possible since the language is countable), where the ϕi are formulas, the xi, x
′
i are
FO variables and the Xi are set variables.
• Let θ3n−2 be ¬∀xnϕn → ¬ϕn[xn/cl], where cl is the first of the new constants neither
occurring in ϕn nor in θk with k < 3n− 2.
• Let θ3n−1 be ¬[LFPx′nXnϕn]xn → (¬Plxn ∧ ¬∃x(¬Plx ∧ ϕn(Pl, x))), where Pl is the first
of the new monadic predicates neither occurring in ϕn nor in θk with k < 3n− 1.
• Let θ3n be ∀xn(ϕn ↔ Plxn), where Pl is the first of the new monadic predicates neither
occurring in ϕn nor in θk with k < 3n.
Call Θ the set of all the θi.
Claim 4.10. Γ ∪Θ is consistent
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If not, then because deductions are finite, for some m ≥ 0, Γ ∪ {θ1, . . . , θm, θm+1} is
inconsistent. Take the least such m. Then, by the definition of consistency and the axioms
of propositional logic, Γ ∪ {θ1, . . . , θm} ⊢ ¬θm+1. Now there are three cases:
(1) θm+1 is of the form ¬∀xϕ → ¬ϕ[x/c], so both Γ ∪ {θ1, . . . , θm} ⊢ ¬∀xϕ and Γ ∪
{θ1, . . . , θm} ⊢ ϕ[x/c]. Since c does not appear in any formula on the left, by Lemma
4.6, Γ ∪ {θ1, . . . , θm} ⊢ ∀xϕ, which contradicts the minimality of m (or the consistency
of Γ if m = 0).
(2) θm+1 is of the form ¬[LFPXxϕ]y → (¬Py ∧ ¬∃x(¬Px ∧ ϕ(P, x))). In such a case both
Γ∪{θ1 . . . θm} ⊢ ¬[LFPXxϕ]y and Γ∪{θ1 . . . θm} ⊢ ¬(¬Py∧¬∃x(¬Px∧ϕ(P, x))) hold.
It follows that Γ ∪ {θ1 . . . θm} ⊢ ∀x(ϕ(P, x) → P (x)) → Py. Since P does not appear
in any formula on the left, by FO(LFP1) generalization, Γ ∪ {θ1 . . . θm} ⊢ [LFPXxϕ]y,
which contradicts the minimality of m (or the consistency of Γ whenever m = 0).
(3) θm+1 is of the form ∀x(ϕ↔ Px). By Lemma 4.8, this is not possible.
We extend Γ ∪Θ to a maximal consistent set Γ∗ in the standard way (see for instance [14,
page 137]).
We will now show that if Γ∗ is a maximal consistent set that contains FO(LFP1)-Henkin
witnesses, then Γ∗ has a FO(LFP1)-Henkin model MΓ∗ .
Definition 4.11. Let Γ∗ ⊆ FORM(σ) be maximal consistent and contain FO(LFP1)-
Henkin witnesses. We define an equivalence relation on the set of FO terms, by letting
t1 ≡Γ∗ t2 iff t1 = t2 ∈ Γ
∗. We denote the equivalence class of a term t by |t|.
Proposition 4.12. ≡Γ∗ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. By FO5 and FO6.
Definition 4.13. We define MΓ∗ (together with a valuation gΓ∗) out of Γ
∗.
• M = {|t| : t is a FO term }
• AMΓ∗ = {AT : T is a set variable or a monadic predicate} where AT = {|t| : T t ∈ Γ
∗}
• (|t1|, . . . , |tn|) ∈ P
M
Γ∗ iff Pt1 . . . tn ∈ Γ
∗
• cMΓ∗ = |c|
• gΓ∗(x) = |x|
• gΓ∗(X) = AX
Proposition 4.14. MΓ∗ is a FO(LFP1)-Henkin structure.
Proof. By construction of Γ∗ which contains FO(LFP1)-Henkin witnesses, this is immediate
(we introduced a monadic predicate for each parametrically definable subset).
Lemma 4.15. (Truth lemma) For every FO(LFP1) formula ϕ, MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ∗.
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
The base case follows from the definition of MΓ∗ together with the maximality of Γ
∗.
Now consider the inductive step:
• Boolean connectives and FO quantifier: exactly as in FO (see [14, page 138]), basically,
for the FO quantifier step we rely on the fact that Γ∗ contains FO(LFP1) Henkin witnesses
and we use the θ3n+2 formulas introduced in the proof of Lemma 4.9.
• LFP operator: we want to show that
MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ |= [LFPXxϕ]y iff [LFPXxϕ]y ∈ Γ
∗
− We first show that
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MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ |= [LFPXxϕ]y implies [LFPXxϕ]y ∈ Γ
∗.
AssumeMΓ∗ , gΓ∗ |= [LFPXxϕ]y, i.e., for all monadic predicate in σ
∗ or set variable T , if
gΓ∗(y) /∈ AT then there exists |t| ∈M , such that |t| /∈ AT and MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ [x/|t|,X/AT ] |=
ϕ. It follows by induction hypothesis that for every such T , if Ty 6∈ Γ∗, then there
exists a term t such that T t 6∈ Γ∗ and ϕ(t, T ) ∈ Γ∗. By maximal consistency of Γ∗ and
using the contraposition of the FO2 axiom, it follows that for all monadic predicate in
σ∗ or set variable T such that Ty 6∈ Γ∗, it holds that ∃x(¬Tx ∧ ϕ(x, T )) ∈ Γ∗. Now
suppose [LFPXxϕ]y /∈ Γ
∗. By maximal consistency of Γ∗, we get ¬[LFPXxϕ]y ∈ Γ
∗.
Then as Γ∗ contains FO(LFP1) Henkin witnesses, there is a predicate T such that for
some n, θ3n−1 ∈ Γ
∗ is of the form ¬[LFPXxϕ]y → (¬Ty ∧ ¬∃x(¬Tx ∧ ϕ(T, x))). By
maximal consistency of Γ∗, it follows that ¬Ty ∧ ¬∃x(¬Tx ∧ ϕ(T, x)) ∈ Γ∗. Hence
there is a predicate T such that Ty 6∈ Γ∗ and ¬∃x(¬Tx ∧ ϕ(x, T )) ∈ Γ∗. But that
contradicts the consistency of Γ∗, as we previously showed that whenever Ty 6∈ Γ∗, then
also ∃x(¬Tx∧ ϕ(x, T )) ∈ Γ∗. Then ¬[LFPXxϕ]y 6∈ Γ
∗ and by maximal consistency of
Γ∗, [LFPXxϕ]y ∈ Γ
∗.
− We now show that [LFPXxϕ]y ∈ Γ
∗ implies MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ |= [LFPXxϕ]y. We consider the
contraposition
MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ 6|= [LFPXxϕ]y implies [LFPXxϕ]y 6∈ Γ
∗.
Assume MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ 6|= [LFPXxϕ]y. So MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ |= ¬[LFPXxϕ]y and there exists a
monadic predicate in σ∗ or a set variable T such that AT ∈ AMΓ∗ , g(y) /∈ AT and for
all |t| ∈ M , |t| ∈ AT or MΓ∗ , gΓ∗ [x/|t|,X/T ] |= ¬ϕ. By induction hypothesis Ty 6∈ Γ
∗
and for all term t, either T t ∈ Γ∗, or ¬ϕ(t, T ) ∈ Γ∗. By maximal consistency of Γ∗,
for all term t, T t ∨ ¬ϕ(t, T ) ∈ Γ∗. Now assume ¬∀x(Tx ∨ ¬ϕ(x, T )) ∈ Γ∗. As Γ∗
contains Henkin witnesses, there is some n and some term t such that θ3n−2 ∈ Γ
∗ is of
the form ¬∀x(Tx ∨ ¬ϕ(x, T ))→ (T t ∨ ¬ϕ(t, T )) and hence T t ∨ ¬ϕ(t, T ) ∈ Γ∗, which
contradicts the maximal consistency of Γ∗. Hence ∀x(Tx∨¬ϕ(x, T )) ∈ Γ∗. By maximal
consistency of Γ∗, ¬Ty∧∀x(Tx∨¬ϕ(T, x)) ∈ Γ∗ and so also ¬Ty∧¬∃x(¬Tx∧ϕ(T, x)) ∈
Γ∗. Now suppose [LFPxXϕ]y ∈ Γ
∗. Then by the LFP axiom, for every monadic
predicate in σ∗ or set variable T , we get that ¬Ty → ∃x(¬T (x) ∧ ϕ(x, T )) ∈ Γ∗ and
so ¬(¬Ty ∧ ¬∃x(¬Tx∧ ϕ(T, x))) ∈ Γ∗. But that contradicts the maximal consistency
of Γ∗.
Theorem 4.16. Every consistent set Γ of FO(LFP1)-formulas is satisfiable in a FO(LFP1)-
Henkin model.
Proof. First turn Γ into a FO(LFP1) maximal consistent set Γ∗ with FO(LFP1)-Henkin
witnesses in a possibly richer signature (with extra individual constants and monadic pred-
icates) σ∗. Then build a structure MΓ∗ out of this Γ
∗. Then the structure MΓ∗ satisfies Γ
∗
under the valuation gΓ∗ and hence it satisfies also Γ (Γ being a subset of Γ
∗).
Compactness follows directly from Definition 3.2 and Theorem 4.5, i.e., a possibly
infinite set of Λ-sentences has a Λ-Henkin model if and only if every finite subset of it has
a Λ-Henkin model. It also follows directly from Theorem 4.5 that ⊢treeΛ is complete on the
class of its Λ-Henkin-models. Nevertheless, by compactness the axioms of ⊢treeΛ also have
infinite models. We overcome this problem by defining a slightly larger class of Henkin
structures, which we will call definably well-founded Λ-quasi-trees.1
1For a nice picture of a quasi-tree that is not definably well-founded, see [2].
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Definition 4.17. A Λ-quasi-tree is any Λ-Henkin structure
(T,<,≺, P1, . . . , Pn,AT )
(where AT is the set of admissible subsets of T ) satisfying the axioms T1–T10 of Figure 5.
A Λ-quasi-tree is definably well founded if, in addition, it satisfies all Λ-instances of the
induction scheme Ind of Figure 5.
With this definition, we obtain from Theorem 4.5 the following:
Corollary 4.18. A set of Λ-formulas is ⊢treeΛ -consistent if and only if it is satisfiable in a
definably well-founded Λ-quasi-tree.
5. Operations on Henkin-Structures
Let Λ ∈ {MSO,FO(TC1),FO(LFP1)}. As noted in Remark 4.4, every finite Λ-Henkin struc-
ture is also a standard structure. Hence, when working in finite model theory, it is enough
to rely on the usual FO constructions to define operations on structures. On the other
hand, even though our main completeness result concerns finite trees, inside the proof we
need to consider infinite (Λ-Henkin) structures and operations on them. In this context,
methods for forming new structures out of existing ones have to be redefined carefully.
We first propose a notion of substructure of a Λ-Henkin-structure generated by one of its
parametrically definable admissible subsets:
Definition 5.1 (Λ-substructure). Let M = (dom(M), P red,AM) be a Λ-Henkin-structure
(where Pred is the interpretation of the predicates). We call MFO = (dom(M), P red) the
relational structure underlying M. Given a parametrically definable set A ∈ AM, the Λ-
substructure of M generated by A is the structure M ↾ A = (〈A〉MFO ,AM↾A), where 〈A〉MFO
is the relational substructure of MFO generated by A (note that A forms the domain of
〈A〉MFO , as the vocabulary is purely relational) and AM↾A = {X ∩A|X ∈ AM}.
Note that in the case of MSO and FO(LFP1), we could also have defined AM↾A in an
alternative way:
Proposition 5.2. Take M and A as previously and consider the structure (M ↾ A)′ =
(〈A〉MFO ,A(M↾A)′), where A(M↾A)′ = {X ⊆ A|X ∈ AM}. Whenever M is a MSO-Henkin
structure or a FO(LFP1)-Henkin structure, M ↾ A and (M ↾ A)′ are one and the same
structure.
Proof. Indeed, take B ∈ AM↾A. So there exists B
′ ∈ AM such that B = B
′∩A. We want to
show that also B′ ∩A ∈ A(M↾A)′ i.e. B
′ ∩A ⊆ A (which obviously holds) and B′ ∩A ∈ AM.
The second condition holds because both B′ and A are parametrically definable in M, so
their intersection also is (B′∩A = {x |M |= Ax∧B′x}). Conversely, consider B ∈ A(M↾A)′ .
As B ⊆ A and B ∈ AM it follows that B ∈ AM↾A (we can take B = B ∩A).
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Now, in order to show that Λ-substructures are Λ-Henkin-structures, we introduce a
notion of relativization and a corresponding relativization lemma. This lemma establishes
that for every Λ-Henkin-structure M and Λ-substructure M ↾ A of M (with A a set para-
metrically definable in M), if a set is parametrically definable in M ↾ A then it is also
parametrically definable in M. This result will be useful again in Section 6.2.
Definition 5.3 (Relativization mapping). Given two Λ-formulas ϕ, ψ having no variables in
common and given a FO variable x occurring free in ψ, we define REL(ϕ,ψ, x) by induction
on the complexity of ϕ and call it the relativization of ϕ to ψ:
• If ϕ is an atom, REL(ϕ,ψ, x) = ϕ,
• If ϕ :≈ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, REL(ϕ,ψ, x) = REL(ϕ1, ψ, x) ∧REL(ϕ2, ψ, x) (similar for ∨,→,¬),
• If ϕ :≈ ∃yχ, REL(ϕ,ψ, x) = ∃y(ψ[y/x] ∧REL(χ,ψ, x)),
• If ϕ :≈ ∃Y χ, REL(ϕ,ψ, x) = ∃Y (∀x(Y x→ ψ) ∧REL(χ,ψ, x)),
• If ϕ :≈ [TCyzχ](u, v),
REL(ϕ,ψ, x) = [TCyzREL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] ∧ ψ[z/x]](u, v),
• If ϕ :≈ [LFPXyχ]z, REL(ϕ,ψ, x) = [LFPXyχ ∧ ψ[y/x]]z.
where ψ[y/x] is the formula obtained by replacing in ψ every occurrence of x by y and
similarly for ψ[z/x].
Hence for instance, REL(∃yP (y), Q(x), x) = ∃y(P (y)∧Q(y)), which is satisfied in any
model M of which the submodel induced by Q contains an element satisfying P .
Lemma 5.4 (Relativization lemma). Let M be a Λ-Henkin-structure, g a valuation on M,
ϕ, ψ Λ-formulas having no variable in common and A = {x | M, g |= ψ}. If g(y) ∈ A for
every variable y occurring free in ϕ and g(Y ) ∈ AM↾A for every set variable Y occurring
free in ϕ, then M, g |= REL(ϕ,ψ, x) ⇔M ↾ A, g |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. Let g be an assignment satisfying the required
conditions. Base case: ϕ is an atom and REL(ϕ,ψ, x) = ϕ. So M, g |= ϕ⇔M ↾ A, g |= ϕ
(by hypothesis, g is a suitable assignment for both models). Inductive hypothesis: the
property holds for every ϕ of complexity at most n. Now consider ϕ of complexity n+ 1.
• ϕ :≈ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 and REL(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ψ, x) :≈ REL(ϕ1, ψ, x) ∧ REL(ϕ2, ψ, x). By induction
hypothesis, the property holds for ϕ1 and for ϕ2. By the semantics of ∧, it also holds for
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2. (Similar for ∨,→,¬.)
• ϕ :≈ ∃yχ and REL(∃yχ) :≈ ∃y(ψ[y/x] ∧ REL(χ,ψ, x)). By inductive hypothesis, for
every node a ∈ A, M, g[a/y] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) ⇔ M ↾ A, g[a/y] |= χ. Hence, by the
semantics of ∃ and by definition of A, M, g |= ∃y(ψ[y/x] ∧ REL(χ,ψ, x)) ⇔ M ↾ A, g |=
∃yχ.
• ϕ :≈ ∃Y χ and REL(∃Y χ,ψ, x) = ∃Y (∀x(Y x→ ψ)∧REL(χ,ψ, x)). As every admissible
subset of M ↾ A is also admissible in M (by Proposition 5.2) it follows by inductive
hypothesis that for every B ∈ AM↾A with B ⊆ A, M, g[B/Y ] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) ⇔ M ↾
A, g[B/Y ] |= χ. Hence, by the semantics of ∃ and by definition of A,M, g |= ∃Y (∀x(Y x→
ψ) ∧REL(χ,ψ, x))⇔M ↾ A, g |= ∃Y χ.
• ϕ :≈ [TCyzχ](u, v) and REL([TCyzχ](u, v), ψ, x) = [TCyzREL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] ∧
ψ[z/x]](u, v). By definition of TC, the following are equivalent:
1. M ↾ A, g |= [TCyzχ](u, v),
2. for all B ∈ AM↾A, if g(u) ∈ B and for all a, b ∈ A, a ∈ B and M ↾ A, g[a/y, b/z] |= χ
implies b ∈ B, then g(v) ∈ B.
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By inductive hypothesis, for all a, b ∈ A,
M, g[a/y, b/z] |= REL(χ,ψ, x)⇔M ↾ A, g[a/y, b/z] |= χ. Hence 2.⇔ 3.:
3. for all B ∈ AM↾A, if g(u) ∈ B and for all a, b ∈ A, a ∈ B and M, g[a/y, b/z] |=
REL(χ,ψ, x) implies b ∈ B, then g(v) ∈ B,
By definition of A, 3.⇔ 4.:
4. for all B ∈ AM↾A, if g(u) ∈ B and for all a, b ∈ dom(M), a ∈ B and M, g[a/y, b/z] |=
REL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] ∧ ψ[z/x] implies b ∈ B, then g(v) ∈ B,
We claim that 4.⇔ 5.:
5. for all C ∈ AM, if g(u) ∈ C and for all a, b ∈ dom(M), a ∈ C and M, g[a/y, b/z] |=
REL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] ∧ ψ[z/x] implies b ∈ C, then g(v) ∈ C,
which, by the semantics of TC, is equivalent to:
6. M, g |= [TCyzREL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] ∧ ψ[z/x]](u, v).
It is clear that 5.⇒ 4.. For the 4.⇒ 5. direction, assume 4.. Take any set C ∈ AM such
that g(u) ∈ C and for all a, b ∈ dom(M), a ∈ C and M, g[a/y, b/z] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) ∧
ψ[y/x] ∧ ψ[z/x] implies b ∈ C. Let B = A ∩ C. By Definition 5.1, B ∈ AM↾A. Now
by our assumptions on g and by definition of A, g[a/y, b/z] only assigns points in A.
So as B = A ∩ C, g(u) ∈ B and for all a, b ∈ dom(M), a ∈ B and M, g[a/y, b/z] |=
REL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] ∧ ψ[z/x] implies b ∈ B. So by 4., g(v) ∈ B. As B ⊆ C, it follows
that g(v) ∈ C.
• ϕ :≈ [LFPXyχ]z and REL([LFPXyχ]z, ψ, x) :≈ [LFPXyχ ∧ ψ[y/x]]z. By definition of
LFP , the following are equivalent:
1. M ↾ A, g |= [LFPXyχ]z,
2. for all B ∈ AM↾A, if for all a ∈ A, M ↾ A, g[a/y,B/X] |= χ implies a ∈ B, then
g(z) ∈ B.
By inductive hypothesis, for all a ∈ A, B ∈ M ↾ A, M, g[a/y,B/X] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) ⇔
M ↾ A, g[a/y,B/X] |= χ. Hence 2. is equivalent to 3.:
3. for all B ∈ AM↾A, if for all a ∈ A, M, g[a/y,B/X] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) implies a ∈ B,
then g(z) ∈ B,
By definition of A, 3.⇔ 4.:
4. for all B ∈ AM↾A, if for all a ∈ dom(M),
M, g[a/y,B/X] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] implies a ∈ B,
then g(z) ∈ B,
We claim that 4.⇔ 5.:
5. for all C ∈ AM, if for all a ∈ dom(M),
M, g[a/y,C/X] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] implies a ∈ C,
then g(z) ∈ C,
which, by the semantics of LFP , is equivalent to:
6. M, g |= [LFPXyREL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x]]z.
It is clear that 5. ⇒ 4.. For the 4. ⇒ 5. direction, assume 4.. Take any set C ∈ AM
such that for all a ∈ dom(M), M, g[a/y,C/X] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x] implies a ∈ C.
Let B = A ∩ C. By Definition 5.1, B ∈ AM↾A. Consider a ∈ dom(M) such that
M, g[a/y,B/X] |= REL(χ,ψ, x) ∧ ψ[y/x]. As REL(χ,ψ, x) is positive in X and X does
not occur in ψ, M, g[a/y,C/X] |= REL(χ,ψ, x)∧ψ[y/x]. Also by hypothesis a ∈ C. Now
as M, g[a/y] |= ψ[y/x], by definition of A, a ∈ A. So a ∈ A ∩ C, i.e, a ∈ B and since we
proved it for arbitrary a ∈ dom(M), by 4., g(z) ∈ B. As B ⊆ C, it follows that g(z) ∈ C.
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Theorem 5.5. Let M and A be as in Definition 5.1. Then M ↾ A is a Λ-Henkin-structure.
Proof. Take B parametrically definable in M ↾ A, i.e., there is a Λ-formula ϕ(y) and an
assignment g such that B = {a ∈ dom(M ↾ A) | M ↾ A, g[a/y] |= ϕ(y)}. Now we know that
A is also parametrically definable in M, i.e., there is a Λ-formula ψ(x) and an assignment g′
such that A = {a ∈ dom(M) |M, g′[a/x] |= ψ(x)}. Assume without loss of generality that ϕ
and ψ have no variables in common. We define an assignment g∗ by letting g∗(z) = g′(z) for
every variable z occurring in ψ and g∗(z) = g(z) otherwise. The situation with set variables
is symmetric. Now by Lemma 5.4, B = {a ∈ dom(M) | M, g∗[a/x] |= REL(ϕ,ψ, x)} and
hence B ∈ AM. By definition 5.1 it follows that B ∈ AM↾A (because B = B ∩A).
There is, in model theory, a whole range of methods to form new structures out of
existing ones. Standard references on the matter are [15, 25], written in a very general
algebraic setting. Familiar constructions like disjoint unions of relational structures are
redefined as particular cases of a new notion of generalized product of FO-structures and
abstract properties of such products are studied. In particular, an important theorem now
called the Feferman-Vaught theorem for FO is proven in [15]. We are particularly interested
in one of its corollaries, which establishes that generalized products of relational structures
preserve elementary equivalence. We show an analogue of this result for a particular case
of generalized product of Λ-Henkin-structures that we call fusion, this notion being itself a
generalization of a notion of disjoint union of Λ-Henkin-structures defined below.
Definition 5.6 (Disjoint union of Λ-Henkin-structures). Let σ be a purely relational vo-
cabulary and σ∗ = σ ∪ {Q1, . . . , Qk}, with {Q1, . . . , Qk} a set of new monadic predicates.
For any Λ-Henkin-structures M1, . . . ,Mk in vocabulary σ with disjoint domains, define
their disjoint union
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi (or, direct sum) to be the σ
∗-frame that has as its domain
the union of the domains of the structures Mi and likewise for the relations, except for the
predicates Qi, whose interpretations are respectively defined as the domain of the structures
Mi (we will use Qi to label the elements of Mi). The set of admissible subsets A⊎
1≤i≤k Mi
is the closure under finite union of the union of the sets of admissible subsets of the Mi.
That is:
• dom(
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi) =
⋃
1≤i≤k dom(Mi)
• P
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi =
⋃
1≤i≤k P
Mi (with P ∈ σ) and Q
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi
i = dom(Mi)
• A ∈ A⊎
1≤i≤k Mi
iff A =
⋃
1≤i≤k Ai for some Ai ∈ AMi
Definition 5.7 (f -fusion of Λ-Henkin-structures). Let σ be a purely relational vocabulary
and σ∗ = σ ∪ {Q1, . . . , Qk}, with {Q1, . . . , Qk} a set of new monadic predicates. Let f be
a function mapping each n-ary predicate P ∈ σ to a quantifier-free first-order formula over
σ∗ in variables x1, . . . , xn. For any Λ-Henkin-structures M1, . . . ,Mk in vocabulary σ with
disjoint domains, define their f -fusion to be the σ-frame
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi that has the same
domain and set of admissible subsets as
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi. For every P ∈ σ, the interpretation of
P in
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi is the set of n-tuples satisfying f(P ) in
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi.
An easy example of f -fusion on standard structures (it is simpler to give an example on
standard structures, as we do not have to say anything about admissible sets) is the ordered
sum of two linear orders (M1, <1), (M2, <2), where all the elements of M1 are before the
elements ofM2. In this case, σ consists of a single binary relation <, the elements of M1 are
indexed with Q1, those of M2 with Q2 and f maps < to x1 < x2 ∨ (Q1x1 ∧Q2x2). Another
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notable example of f -fusion is the σ ∪ {Q1, . . . , Qk}-structure
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi =
⊕f
1≤i≤k M
+
i ,
where f is the identity function and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, M+i is the expansion of the σ-
structureMi in which Q
M
+
i
i = dom(Mi) and Q
M
+
i
j = ∅ for every i 6= j. In this sense, disjoint
union as we defined it above can be seen as a special case of fusion.
We show preservation results involving f -fusions of Λ-Henkin-structures. Hence we deal
with analogues of elementary equivalence for these logics and we refer to Λ-equivalence. Let
us recall that by quantifier depth of a Λ-formula, we mean the maximal number of nested
quantifiers in the formula (by “quantifier”, we mean FO and MSO-quantifiers, as well as
TC or LFP -operators).
Definition 5.8. Given two Λ-Henkin-structures M and N, we write M ≡Λ N and say
that M and N are Λ-equivalent if they satisfy the same Λ-sentences. Also, for any natural
number n, we write M ≡nΛ N and say that M and N are n-Λ-equivalent if M and N satisfy
the same Λ-sentences of quantifier depth at most n. In particular, M ≡Λ N holds iff, for all
n, M ≡nΛ N holds.
Now we are ready to introduce the “Feferman-Vaught theorems” that we will show in
Section 5.2 and which establish that f -fusions of Λ-Henkin-structures preserve Λ-equivalence,
that is:
Theorem 5.9. Let M1, . . . ,Mk, N1, . . . ,Nk be Λ-Henkin structures. Whenever Mi ≡
n
Λ Ni
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then also
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi ≡
n
Λ
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi.
We will also show in this section that every f -fusion of Λ-Henkin-structures is a Λ-
Henkin-structure. Comparable work had already been done by Makowski in [25] for exten-
sions of FO, but an important difference is that he only considered standard structures,
whereas we need to deal with Λ-Henkin-structures. Our proofs make use of Ehrenfeucht-
Fra¨ısse´ games for each of the logics Λ.
5.1. Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ Games on Henkin-Structures.
Let Λ ∈ {MSO,FO(TC1),FO(LFP1)}. We survey Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games for FO, MSO,
FO(TC1), and FO(LFP1) which are suitable to use on Henkin structures. We also provide
an adequacy proof for the FO(TC1) game. The MSO game is a rather straightforward
extension of the FO case and has already been used by other authors (see for instance
[23]). The FO(LFP1) game is borrowed from Uwe Bosse [4]. It also applies to Henkin
structures, as careful inspection shows. The FO(TC1) game has already been mentioned in
passing by Erich Gra¨del in [17] as an alternative to the game he used and we show that it
is adequate for Henkin semantics. It looks also similar to a system of partial isomorphisms
given in [6]. However it is important to note that this game is very different from the
FO(TC1) game which is actually used in [17]. The two games are equivalent when played
on standard structures, but not when played on FO(TC1)-Henkin structures. This is so
because the game used in [6] relies on the alternative semantics for the TC operator given
in Proposition 2.4, so that only finite sets of points can be chosen by players ; whereas
the game we use involves choices of not necessarily finite admissible subsets. These are
not equivalent approaches. Indeed, on FO(TC1)-Henkin structures a simple compactness
argument shows that the semantical clause of Proposition 2.4 (defined in terms of existence
of a finite path) is not adequate.
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Let us first introduce basic notions connected to these games. One rather trivial suf-
ficient condition for Λ-equivalence is the existence of an isomorphism. Clearly isomor-
phic structures satisfy the same Λ-formulas. A more interesting sufficient condition for
Λ-equivalence is that of Duplicator having a winning strategy in all Λ Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´
games of finite length. To define this, we first need this notion:
Definition 5.10 (Finite Partial Isomorphism). A finite partial isomorphism between struc-
tures M and N is a finite relation {(a1, b1), . . . , (an, bn)} between the domains of M and N
such that for all atomic formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), M |= ϕ [a1, . . . , an] iff N |= ϕ [b1, . . . , bn].
Since equality statements are atomic formulas, every finite partial isomorphism is (the graph
of) a injective partial function.
We will also need the following lemma:
Lemma 5.11 (Finiteness Lemma). Fix any set x1, . . . , xk,Xk+1, . . . ,Xm. In a finite rela-
tional vocabulary, up to logical equivalence, with these free variables, there are only finitely
many Λ-formulas of quantifier depth ≤ n.
Proof. This can be shown by induction on k. In a finite relational vocabulary, with finitely
many free variables, there are only finitely many atomic formulas. Now, any Λ-formula of
quantifier depth k + 1 is equivalent to a Boolean combination of atoms and formulas of
quantifier depth k prefixed by a quantifier. Applying a quantifier to equivalent formulas
preserves equivalence and the Boolean closure of a finite set of formulas remains finite, up
to logical equivalence.
Now, as we are concerned with extensions of FO, every Λ-game will be defined as an
extension of the classical FO game, that we recall here:
Definition 5.12 (FO Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ Game). The FO Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game of
length n on standard structures M and N (notation: EFnFO(M,N)) is as follows. There
are two players, Spoiler and Duplicator. The game has n rounds, each of which consists
of a move of Spoiler followed by a move of Duplicator. Spoiler’s moves consist of picking
an element from one of the two structures, and Duplicator’s responses consist of picking an
element in the other structure. In this way, Spoiler and Duplicator build up a finite binary
relation between the domains of the two structures: initially, the relation is empty; each
round, it is extended with another pair. The winning conditions are as follows: if at some
point of the game the constructed binary relation is not a finite partial isomorphism, then
Spoiler wins immediately. If after each round the relation is a finite partial isomorphism,
then the game is won by Duplicator.
Theorem 5.13 (FO Adequacy). Assume a finite relational first-order language. Duplicator
has a winning strategy in the game EFnFO(M,N) iff M ≡
n
FO N. In particular, Duplicator
has a winning strategy in all EF-games of finite length between M and N if and only if
M ≡FO N.
The proof for the first order case is classic. We refer the reader to the proof given in
[13] or to the one in [24].
For technical convenience in the course of inductive proofs, we extend the notion of
FO parameter by considering set parameters, i.e., instead of interpreting a set variable as a
name of the admissible set A, we can add a new monadic predicate A to the signature. The
new predicates and the sets they name are called set parameters. (This is similar to the FO
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notion that can be found in [19].) We will work with parametrized (or expanded) Henkin-
structures, that is, structures considered together with partial valuations. This means that
the assignment is possibly non empty at the beginning of the game, which can start with
some “handicap” for Duplicator, i.e., some preliminary set of already “distinguished objects
and sets”.
We first define a necessary and sufficient condition for MSO equivalence by extending
Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games from FO to MSO. This game has already been defined in the
literature, see for instance [23].
Definition 5.14 (MSO Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ Game). Consider two MSO-Henkin structures
M together with A¯ ∈ Ar
M
, a¯ ∈ dom(M)s and N together with B¯ ∈ Ar
N
, b¯ ∈ dom(N)s and
r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, n ≥ 0. The MSO Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game EFnMSO((M, A¯, a¯), (N, B¯, b¯)) of
length n on expanded structures (M, A¯, a¯) and (N, B¯, b¯) is defined as for the first-order
case, except that each time she chooses a structure, Spoiler can choose either an element
or an admissible subset of its domain. For a given Ar+1 ∈ AM chosen by Spoiler, (M, A¯, a¯)
is expanded to (M, A¯, Ar+1, a¯). Duplicator then responds by choosing Br+1 ∈ AN and
(N, B¯, b¯) is expanded to (N, B¯, Br+1, b¯). The game goes on with the so expanded structures.
The winning conditions are as follows: if at some point of the game a¯ 7→ b¯ is not a finite
partial isomorphism from (M, A¯, Ar+1) to (N, B¯, Br+1), then Spoiler wins immediately. If
after each round the relation is a finite partial isomorphism, then the game is won by
Duplicator.
Theorem 5.15 (MSO Adequacy). Assume a finite relational MSO language. Given M and
N, A¯ ∈ Ar
M
, B¯ ∈ Ar
N
, a¯ ∈ dom(M)s, b¯ ∈ dom(N)s and r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, Duplicator has a
winning strategy in the game EFnMSO((M, A¯, a¯), (N, B¯, b¯)) iff (M, A¯, a¯) and (N, B¯, b¯) satisfy
the same MSO formulas of quantifier depth n. In particular, Duplicator has a winning
strategy in all EFMSO-games of finite length between (M, A¯, a¯) and (N, B¯, b¯) if and only if
(M, A¯, a¯) and (N, B¯, b¯) satisfy the same MSO formulas.
We omit the proof, because it parallels the FO case. The proof works regardless whether
MSO is interpreted in the standard or in the Henkin way. What matters here is that the
game-theoretic meaning of a “quantification” over a given “domain”, lies in the choice of an
element from that domain (including one consisting of “higher-order elements”, e.g., sets).
Corollary 5.16. For MSO-Henkin-structures M, N and n ≥ 0, Duplicator has a winning
strategy in EFnMSO(M,N) if and only if M ≡
n
MSO N. In particular, Duplicator has a winning
strategy in all EFMSO-games of finite length between M and N if and only if M ≡MSO N.
The FO(TC1) game that we will be introducing now had been already mentioned in
passing by Erich Gra¨del in [17] as an alternative to the game he used. We will show that it
is adequate on Henkin-structures.
Definition 5.17 (FO(TC1) Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ Game). Consider two FO(TC1)-Henkin
structures M and N together with a¯ ∈ dom(M)s, b¯ ∈ dom(N)s and s ≥ 0, n ≥ 0. The
FO(TC1)-game EFnFO(TC1)((M, a¯), (N, b¯)) of length n on expanded structures (M, a¯) and
(N, b¯) is defined as for the first-order case, except that each time she chooses a structure,
Spoiler can either choose only one element or an admissible subset together with two ele-
ments of its domain. In the first case we say that she plays an ∃ (or point) move and in
the second case, a TC-move (which we will define more precisely below). Each point move
results in an extension of the assignment {a¯ 7→ b¯} with elements as+1 ∈ dom(M), bs+1 ∈
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dom(N). Each TC-move results in an extension of the assignment {a¯ 7→ b¯} with elements
as+1, as+2 ∈ dom(M), bs+1, bs+2 ∈ dom(N). At each round, Spoiler chooses the kind of
move to be played.
The ∃ move is defined as in the FO case. The TC-move is as follows:
Spoiler considers two pebbles (ai, bi) and (aj , bj) on the board (i.e., corresponding cou-
ples of parameters taken in each structure) and depending on the structure that he chooses
to consider, he plays:
• either a set A ∈ AM with ai ∈ A and aj /∈ A. Duplicator then answers with a set B ∈ AN
such that bi ∈ B and bj /∈ B. Spoiler now picks bs+1 ∈ B, bs+2 /∈ B and Duplicator
answers with as+1 ∈ A, as+2 /∈ A.
• or a set B ∈ AN with bi ∈ B and bj /∈ B. Duplicator then answers with a set A ∈ AM
such that ai ∈ A and aj /∈ A. Spoiler now picks as+1 ∈ A, as+2 /∈ A and Duplicator
answers with bs+1 ∈ B, bs+2 /∈ B.
In each TC-move, the assignment is extended with as+1 7→ bs+1, as+2 7→ bs+2. After n
moves, Duplicator has won if the constructed assignment a¯ 7→ b¯ is a partial isomorphism
(i.e. the game continues with the two new pebbles in each structure, but the sets A and B
are forgotten).
Theorem 5.18 (FO(TC1) Adequacy). Assume a finite relational FO(TC1) language. Given
two FO(TC1)-Henkin structures M and N, a¯ ∈ dom(M)s, b¯ ∈ dom(N)s and r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0,
n ≥ 0, Spoiler has a winning strategy in the game EFnFO(TC1)((M, a¯), (N, b¯)) iff there is a
FO(TC1) formula of quantifier depth n distinguishing (M, a¯) and (N, b¯).
Proof.
⇒ From the existence of a winning strategy for Spoiler in the FO(TC1)-game of length n in
between (M, a¯) and (N, b¯), we will infer the existence of a FO(TC1)-formula of quantifier
depth n distinguishing (M, a¯) and (N, b¯).
By induction on n.
Base step: With 0 round the initial match between distinguished objects must have
failed to be a partial isomorphism for Spoiler to win. This implies that (M, a¯) and (N, b¯)
disagree on some atomic formula.
Inductive step: The induction hypothesis says that for every two structures, if Spoiler
can win their comparison game over n rounds, then the structures disagree on some
FO(TC1)-formula of quantifier depth n. Assume that for some structures (M, a¯), (N, b¯),
Spoiler has a winning strategy for the game over n+1 rounds. Let us reason on Spoiler’s
first move in the game. It can either be a TC or an ∃ move.
If it is an ∃ move, then it means that Spoiler picks an element a in one of the two
structures, so that no matter what element b Duplicator picks in the other, Spoiler has
an n-round winning strategy. But then we can use the induction hypothesis, and find
for each such b a formula ϕb(x) that distinguishes (M, a¯, a) from (N, b¯, b). In fact we can
assume that in each case the respective formula is true of (M, a¯, a) and false of (N, b¯, b)
(by negating the formula if needed). Now take the big conjunction ϕ(x) of all these
formulas (which is equivalent to a finite formula according to Lemma 5.11) and prefix
it with an existential quantifier. Then the resulting formula is true in (M, a¯) but false
in (N, b¯). It is true in (M, a¯) if we pick a for the existentially quantified variable. And
no matter which element we pick in (N, b¯), it will always falsify one of the conjuncts
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in the formula, by construction. So, the new formula is false in (N, b¯). I.e., ∃xϕ(x) of
quantifier depth n+ 1 distinguishes (M, a¯) and (N, b¯).
If Spoiler’s first move is a TC-move, then it means that Spoiler picks a subset in one
structure, let say A ∈ AM (with ai ∈ A and aj 6∈ A), so that no matter which B ∈ AN
(with bi ∈ B and bj 6∈ B) Duplicator picks in the other structure, Spoiler can pick bk ∈ B,
bk+1 6∈ B such that no matter which ak ∈ A, ak+1 6∈ A Duplicator picks, Spoiler has
an n-round winning strategy. For each B that might be chosen by Duplicator, Spoiler’s
given strategy gives a fixed couple bk, bk+1. For each response ak, ak+1 of Duplicator,
we thus obtain by inductive hypothesis a discriminating formula ϕB,ak ,ak+1(x, y) that
we can assume to be true in (N, b¯) for bk, bk+1 and false in (M, a¯) for ak, ak+1. Now for
each B, let us take the big conjunction ΦB(x, y) of all these formulas (which is finite, by
Lemma 5.11). We can then construct the big disjunction Φ(x, y) (again finite, by the
same lemma) of all the formulas ΦB(x, y).
Considering the first round in the game together with the inductive hypothesis, note
that the MSO formula ∃X(ai ∈ X ∧ aj 6∈ X ∧ ∀xy((x ∈ X ∧ y 6∈ X) → ¬Φ(x, y)))
holds in (M, a¯). Indeed, by induction hypothesis, any couple ak ∈ A, ak+1 6∈ A that
Duplicator might choose in dom(M) will always falsify at least one of the conjuncts
of each ΦB(x, y). Finally, the formula Φ(x, y) being constructed as the disjunction
of all the formulas ΦB(x, y), any such couple ak, ak+1 will also falsify Φ(x, y). Now
the MSO formula ∃X(ai ∈ X ∧ aj 6∈ X ∧ ∀xy((x ∈ X ∧ y 6∈ X) → ¬Φ(x, y))) is
equivalent to ∃X(ai ∈ X ∧ aj 6∈ X ∧¬∃xy(x ∈ X ∧Φ(x, y)∧ y 6∈ X)), which means that
(M, a¯) 6|= [TCxyΦ(x, y)](ai, aj).
On the other hand for the same reasons, note that it holds in (N, b¯) that ∀X((bi ∈
X ∧ bj 6∈ X) → ∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ y 6∈ X ∧ Φ(x, y))). Indeed, by induction hypothesis, for
each B that Duplicator might choose in AN Spoiler will always be able to find a couple
bk ∈ B, bk+1 6∈ B satisfying all the conjuncts of the corresponding formulas ΦB(x, y).
Finally, the formula Φ(x, y) being constructed as the disjunction of all the formulas
ΦB(x, y), such a couple ak, ak+1 will also satisfy Φ(x, y). Now ∀X((bi ∈ X ∧ bj 6∈ X)→
∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ y 6∈ X ∧ Φ(x, y))) is equivalent to ∀X(bi 6∈ X ∨ bj ∈ X ∨ ∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ y 6∈
X ∧ Φ(x, y))), which means that (N, b¯) |= [TCxyΦ(x, y)](bi, bj).
Let u be a name for the parameters ai, bi and v for bi, bj . [TCxyΦ(x, y)](u, v) of
quantifier depth n+ 1 distinguishes (N, a¯) and (M, b¯).
⇐ From the existence of a FO(TC1) formula of quantifier depth n distinguishing (M, a¯)
and (N, b¯) we will infer the existence of a winning strategy for Spoiler in the game
EFnFO+TC((M, a¯), (N, b¯)).
By induction on n.
Base step: Doing nothing is a strategy for Spoiler.
Inductive step: The inductive hypothesis says that, for every two structures, if they
disagree on some FO(TC1) formula of quantifier depth n, then Spoiler has a winning
strategy in the n-round game. Now, assume that some expanded structures (M, a¯),
(N, b¯) disagree on some FO(TC1) formula χ of quantifier depth n + 1. Any such for-
mula must be equivalent to a Boolean combination of formulas of the form ∃xψ(x) and
[TCxyϕ(x, y)](u, v) with ψ, ϕ of quantifier depth at most n. If χ distinguishes the two
structures, then there is at least one component of this Boolean combination which
suffices for distinguishing them.
Let us first suppose that it is of the form ∃xψ(x). We may assume without loss
of generality that (M, a¯) |= ∃xψ(x) whereas (N, b¯) 6|= ∃xψ(x). Then it means that
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there exists an object a ∈ dom(M) such that (M, a¯) |= ψ(a) whereas for every object
b ∈ dom(N), (N, b¯) 6|= ψ(b). But then we can use our induction hypothesis and find for
each such b a winning strategy for Spoiler in EFnFO(TC1)((M, a¯, a), (N, b¯, b)). We can infer
that Spoiler has a winning strategy in EFn+1FO(TC1)((M, a¯), (N, b¯)). His first move consists
in picking the object a in dom(M) and for each response b in dom(N) of Duplicator, the
remaining of his winning strategy is the same as in EFnFO(TC1)((M, a¯, a), (N, b¯, b)).
We now suppose that [TCxyϕ(x, y)](u, v) of quantifier depth n+1 distinguishes the two
structures. We may assume without loss of generality that (M, a¯) |= [TCxyϕ(x, y)](u, v)
i.e. it holds in (M, a¯) that ∀X((ai ∈ X ∧ aj 6∈ X) → ∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ y 6∈ X ∧ ϕ(x, y))),
whereas (N, b¯) 6|= [TCxyϕ(x, y)](u, v) i.e. it holds in (N, b¯) that ∃X(bi ∈ X ∧ bj 6∈
X ∧ ¬∃xy(x ∈ X ∧ ϕ(x, y) ∧ y 6∈ X)). We want to show that Spoiler has a winning
strategy in EFn+1FO(TC1)((M, a¯), (N, b¯)). Let us describe her first move. She first chooses
(N, b¯) and B ∈ AN such that bi ∈ B ∧ bj 6∈ B ∧ ¬∃xy(x ∈ B ∧ ϕ(x, y) ∧ y 6∈ B).
By definition of TC, such a set exists. Duplicator has to respond by picking a set
A in AM containing ai and not aj . Spoiler then picks ak ∈ A and ak+1 6∈ A such
that (M, a¯) |= ϕ(ak, ak+1). This is possible because by definition of TC, for any
possible choice A of Duplicator (i.e., any set A containing ai and not aj) we have
∃xy(x ∈ A ∧ y 6∈ A ∧ ϕ(x, y)). But that means that Duplicator is now stuck and
has to pick bk ∈ B and bk+1 6∈ B such that (N, b¯) 6|= ϕ(bk, bk+1). Consequently,
we have (N, b¯, bk, bk+1) 6|= ϕ(x, y), whereas (M, a¯, ak, ak+1) |= ϕ(x, y). As ϕ(x, y)
is of quantifier depth n, by induction hypothesis, Spoiler has a winning strategy in
EFnFO(TC1)((M, a¯, ak, ak+1), (N, b¯, bk, bk+1)). The remaining of Spoiler’s winning strategy
in EFn+1FO(TC1)((M, a¯), (N, b¯)) (i.e. after her first move, that we already accounted for) is
consequently as in EFnFO(TC1)((M, a¯, ak, ak+1), (N, b¯, bk, bk+1)).
Corollary 5.19. For structures M, N and n ≥ 0, Duplicator has a winning strategy in
EFnFO(TC1)(M,N) if and only if M ≡
n
FO(TC1) N. In particular, Duplicator has a winning
strategy in all EFFO(TC1)-games of finite length between M and N if and only if M ≡FO(TC1)
N.
Let us finally consider the FO(LFP1) case. There are two classical equivalent syntactic
ways of defining the syntax of FO(LFP1): the one we used in Section 2.2 and another one,
dispensing with restrictions to positive formulas, but allowing negations only in front of
atomic formulas and introducing a greatest fixed-point operator as the dual of the least
fixed-point operator (also ∀ cannot be defined using ∃ and has to be introduced separately,
similarly for the Boolean connectives). This second way of defining FO(LFP1) turns out to
be more convenient to define an adequate Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game. The game is suitable
to use on Henkin structures because the semantics on which it relies is merely a syntactical
variant of the one given in Section 4. Now the FO(LFP1)-formulas [LFPXxϕ(x,X)]y and
[GFPXxϕ(x,X)]y, stating that a point belongs to the least fixed-point, or respectively, to
the greatest fixed-point induced by the formula ϕ satisfy the following equations:
[LFPXxϕ(x,X)]y ↔ ∀X(¬Xy → ∃x(¬Xx ∧ ϕ(x,X)))
[GFPXxϕ(x,X)]y ↔ ∃X(Xy ∧ ∀x(Xx→ ϕ(x,X)))
Note that this holds no matter whether we be concerned with FO(LFP1) and MSO on
standard structures or on Henkin structures. The consideration of these equations is the
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key idea behind an Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game defined by Uwe Bosse in [4] for least fixed-
point logic FO(LFP) (i.e. where fixed-points are not only considered for monadic operators,
but for any n-ary operator). FO(LFP1) being simply the monadic fragment of FO(LFP),
the game for FO(LFP) can be adapted to FO(LFP1) in a straightforward way:
Definition 5.20 (FO(LFP1) Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game). Consider FO(LFP1)-Henkin struc-
tures M and N together with a¯ ∈ dom(M)s, b¯ ∈ dom(N)s, A¯ ∈ Ar
M
, b¯ ∈ Ar
N
, r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0,
n ≥ 0. In the game EFnFO(LFP1)((M, A¯, a¯), (N, B¯, b¯)) of length n, there are two types of
moves, point and fixed-point moves. Each move results in an extension of the assignment
a¯ 7→ b¯, A¯ 7→ B¯ with elements as+1 ∈ dom(M), bs+1 ∈ dom(N), and possibly (in the case of
fixed-point moves) with sets Ar+1 ∈ AM, Br+1 ∈ AN. Spoiler chooses the kind of move to
be played. Now the following moves are possible:
• ∃ move: Spoiler chooses as+1 ∈ dom(M) and Duplicator bs+1 ∈ dom(N).
• ∀ move: Spoiler chooses bs+1 ∈ dom(N) and Duplicator as+1 ∈ dom(M).
In each point move, the assignment is extended by as+1 7→ bs+1.
• LFP move: Spoiler chooses Br+1 ∈ AN \ {dom(N)} with some pebble bi 6∈ Br+1 and
Duplicator responds with Ar+1 ∈ AM \ {dom(M)}.
Now Spoiler chooses in dom(M) a new element as+1 6∈ Ar+1 and Duplicator answers
in dom(N) with bs+1 6∈ Br+1.
• GFP move: Spoiler chooses Ar+1 ∈ AM \ {dom(M)} with some pebble ai ∈ Ar+1 and
Duplicator responds with Br+1 ∈ AN \ {dom(N)} such that Br+1 6= ∅.
Now Spoiler chooses in dom(N) a new element bs+1 ∈ Br+1 and Duplicator answers in
dom(M) with as+1 ∈ Ar+1.
In each fixed-point move the assignment is extended by Ar+1 7→ Br+1, as+1 7→ bs+1.
After n moves, Duplicator has won if the constructed element assignment a¯ 7→ b¯ is a
partial isomorphism and for the subset assignment A¯ 7→ B¯, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ r and i ≤ s:
ai ∈ Aj implies bi ∈ Bj
We call an assignment with these properties a posimorphism.
Theorem 5.21 (FO(LFP1) Adequacy). Assume a finite relational FO(LFP1) language.
Given two FO(LFP1)-Henkin structures M and N, A¯ ∈ Ar
M
, B¯ ∈ Br
N
, a¯ ∈ dom(M)s,
b¯ ∈ dom(N)s and r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game
EFnFO(LFP1)((M, A¯, a¯), (N, B¯, b¯)) iff (M, A¯, a¯) and (N, B¯, b¯) satisfy the same FO(LFP1)-for-
mulas of quantifier depth n.
For a proof in the case of standard structures, we refer the reader to Uwe Bosse [4]. As
pointed out earlier, the same argument works as well in the case of Henkin structures.
5.2. Fusion Theorems on Henkin-Structures. Let Λ ∈ {MSO,FO(TC1),FO(LFP1)}.
We show our analogues of Feferman-Vaught theorem for fusions of Λ-Henkin-structures. We
will refer to them as Λ-fusion Theorems, even though they will sometimes be formally first
stated as corollaries. What we show is, more precisely, that fusion of Λ-Henkin-structures
preserve Λ-equivalence for all fixed quantifier-depths.
In order to give inductive proofs for MSO and FO(LFP1), it will be more convenient to
consider parametrized Λ-Henkin-structures where the set of set parameters is closed under
union, this notion being defined below. This is safe because whenever two parametrized
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structures (M, A¯, a¯) and (N, B¯, b¯) are n-Λ-equivalent, it follows trivially that M and N
considered together with a subset of this set of parameters are also n-Λ-equivalent.
Definition 5.22. Let A1, . . . , Ak be a finite sequence of set parameters. We define the
sequence (A1, . . . , Ak)
∪ as the finite sequence of set parameters obtained by closing the set
{A1, . . . , Ak} under union, i.e., (A1, . . . , Ak)
∪ = {
⋃
i∈I Ai|I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}}. (We additionally
assume that this set is ordered in a fixed canonical way, depending on the index sets I.)
Theorem 5.23 (Fusion Theorem for MSO). Let Mi and Ni be MSO-Henkin structures,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Furthermore, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let a¯i, b¯i be sequences of first-order parameters
of the form ai1 , . . . , aim , bi1 , . . . , bim (where m ∈ N may depend on i) and A¯i, B¯i sequences
of set parameters of the form Ai1 , . . . , Aim′ , Bi1 , . . . , Bim′ (where m
′ ∈ N may again depend
on i). Whenever
(Mi, A¯i, a¯i) ≡
n
MSO (Ni, B¯i, b¯i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
then also
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k ≡
n
MSO
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k.
.
Proof. We define a winning strategy for Duplicator in the game
EFnMSO((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k))
out of her winning strategies in the games EFnMSO((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)) by induction on
n.
Base step: n = 0, doing nothing is a strategy for Duplicator. We need to show that
(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k)
and
(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k)
agree on all atomic formulas. Now in the fusion structures, each atomic formula is de-
fined by f in terms of a σ∗-quantifier free formula that is evaluated in the corresponding
disjoint union structure. So it is enough to show that the disjoint union structures agree
on all atomic σ∗-formulas and on their Boolean combinations. The initial match between
the distinguished objects in (Mi, A¯i, a¯i) and (Ni, B¯i, b¯i) is a partial isomorphism for every
1 ≤ i ≤ k, so it is also one for
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k and
⊎
1≤i≤k Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k i.e. the
two disjoint union structures extended with FO parameters agree on all σ∗-atomic formu-
las. We still need to show that it is also one for
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k and⊎
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k i.e. the two disjoint union structures extended with FO
parameters and the closure under union of set parameters agree on all σ∗-atomic formulas.
It is enough to point that for every parameter aij , for every I ⊆ {i1, . . . , im′ , . . . , k1, km′}
by construction of
⋃
i∈I Ai in (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, the following are equivalent:
•
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k |=
⋃
i∈I Aiaij ,
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•
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, Ail , a¯1, . . . , a¯k |= Ailaij for some il in I.
Similarly for every parameter bij , by construction of
⋃
i∈I Bi in (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, the following
are equivalent:
•
⊎
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k |=
⋃
i∈I Bibij ,
•
⊎
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, Bil , b¯1, . . . , b¯k |= Bilbij for some il in I.
But by Duplicator’s winning strategy in the small structure games, we know that the
following are equivalent:
•
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, Ail , a¯1, . . . , a¯k |= Ailaij for some il in I.
•
⊎
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, Bil , b¯1, . . . , b¯k |= Bilbij for some il in I.
So the following are also equivalent:
•
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k |=
⋃
i∈I Aiaij ,
•
⊎
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k |=
⋃
i∈I Bibij ,
So the two extended disjoint union structures agree on all σ∗-atomic formulas. Now relying
on the semantics of Boolean connectives, it can be shown by induction on the complexity
of quantifier free sentences that they also agree on all Boolean combinations of atomic
σ∗-sentences.
Inductive step: the inductive hypothesis says that whenever Duplicator has a winning
strategy in EFnMSO((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, he also has one in
EFnMSO((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k)).
We want to show that this also holds when the length of the games is n + 1. Sup-
pose Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game EFn+1MSO((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We describe Duplicator’s answer to Spoiler’s first move in the game
EFn+1MSO((
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, A¯1, . . . , A¯k, a¯1, . . . , a¯k), (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, B¯1, . . . , B¯k, b¯1, . . . , b¯k)).
It will then follow by induction hypothesis, that he has a winning strategy in the remaining
n-length game.
• Spoiler’s first move is a point move. Suppose Spoiler picks a in
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi. Then
a belongs to dom(Mi) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. So Duplicator uses his winning strategy
in EFn+1MSO((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)) to pick b ∈ dom(Ni), so that he still has a winning
strategy in EFnMSO((Mi, A¯i, a¯i, a), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i, b)). By induction hypothesis he also has one
in the remaining n-length MSO game between the following two structures:
(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a)
and
(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b)
• Spoiler’s first move is a set move. Suppose Spoiler chooses a set A in the set of admissible
subsets of
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi. Then A is necessarily of the form A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ak, with Ai an
admissible subset of Mi. We now define locally his response B = B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bk, using
his winning strategies in the small structures, so that he still has a winning strategy in
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EFnMSO((Mi, A¯i, Ai, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, Bi, b¯i)) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By induction hypothesis, he
also has one in the remaining n-length MSO game between the following two structures:
(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, A1, . . . , A¯k, Ak)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k)
and
(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, B1, . . . , B¯k, Bk)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k).
(Note that this is enough, because A ∈ (A¯1, A1, . . . , A¯k, Ak)
∪.)
Now an analogue of this result for disjoint unions can easily be derived as a corollary of
Theorem 5.23. For the convenience of the reader, we provide here the detailed argument:
Corollary 5.24. Whenever (Mi, A¯i, a¯i) ≡
n
MSO (Ni, B¯i, b¯i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k (with a¯i a
sequence of first-order parameters of the form ai1 , . . . , aim with m ∈ N and A¯i a sequence
of set parameters of the form Ai1 , . . . , Aim′ with m
′ ∈ N, similarly for the b¯i and B¯i), then
also
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k ≡
n
MSO
⊎
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k.
Proof. Let (Mi, A¯i, a¯i) ≡
n
MSO (Ni, B¯i, b¯i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k (with a¯i a sequence of first-order
parameters of the form ai1 , . . . , aim with m ∈ N and A¯i a sequence of set parameters of the
form Ai1 , . . . , Aim′ with m
′ ∈ N, similarly for the b¯i and B¯i).
Now consider the following expansions M′i and N
′
i of the σ structures Mi and Ni to
σ∗ = σ ∪{Q1, . . . , Qk}: the interpretation of Qj is empty in M
′
i (respectively N
′
i) whenever
i 6= j and it is the domain of M′i (respectively N
′
i) whenever i = j.
Clearly (M′i, A¯i, a¯i) ≡
n
MSO (N
′
i, B¯i, b¯i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Now consider a mapping f such that for every n-ary predicate P ∈ σ∗, f(P ) =
Px1 . . . xn. By Theorem 5.23 we have that
f⊕
1≤i≤k
M
′
i, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k ≡
n
MSO
f⊕
1≤i≤k
N
′
i, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k.
Corollary 5.24 follows, because
f⊕
1≤i≤k
M
′
i, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k and
f⊕
1≤i≤k
N
′
i, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k
are isomorphic (w.r.t. σ) to
⊎
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k and
⊎
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k
respectively.
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Another important corollary of Theorem 5.23 is the fact that fusions of MSO-Henkin
structures are also MSO-Henkin structures. Let us stress the importance of this fact, which
is needed for the correctness of our main completeness argument.
Corollary 5.25. A⊕f
1≤i≤k
Mi
is closed under MSO parametric definability and so
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi
is a MSO-Henkin structure.
Proof. First note that the following are equivalent:
• B is MSO parametrically definable in M,
• for some n, there is a finite sequence of parameters a¯, A¯ such that B is defined by a MSO
formula ϕ of quantifier depth n using a¯, A¯,
• for some n, for every two points a, a′ ∈ dom(M), if they are MSO n-indistinguishable
using a¯, A¯, then a ∈ B iff a′ ∈ B.
Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is B ⊆ dom(
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi) MSO para-
metrically definable in
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi using a¯
′, A¯′, but B /∈ A⊕f
1≤i≤k
Mi
. So it means that for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ai = B ∩ dom(Mi) is not MSO parametrically definable in Mi i.e. there
are two MSO parametrically indistinguishable points a ∈ B, a′ /∈ B. So for all n, for all
sequence of parameters a¯, A¯ in Mi,
(Mi, a¯, A¯, a) ≡
n
MSO (Mi, a¯, A¯, a
′)
and by the fusion theorem,2
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯, A¯, a¯′, A¯′, a ≡
n
MSO
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯, A¯, a¯′, A¯′, a
′
But this entails that B is not MSO parametrically definable in ⊕f1≤i≤k Mi using a¯′, A¯′,
which is a contradiction.
Corollary 5.26. A⊎
1≤i≤k Mi
is closed under MSO parametric definability and so
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi
is a MSO-Henkin structure.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.25 (as A⊕f
1≤i≤k
Mi
= A⊎
1≤i≤k Mi
).
Let us now consider the FO(TC1) case. As TC moves can only be played when there
are already two pebbles on the board, it is more convenient to show first a version of our
FO(TC1) fusion theorem in which each small structure comes with at least two parameters.
This allows us to define Duplicator’s answer to a TC move played in a big structure, by
means of his winning strategies in the corresponding small structures. We then derive as a
corollary the fusion theorem for non-parametrized structures.
Theorem 5.27 (Fusion Theorem for FO(TC1)). Let Mi and Ni be FO(TC1)-Henkin struc-
tures, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Furthermore, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let a¯i, b¯i be sequences of first-order
parameters of the form ai1 , . . . , aim , bi1 , . . . , bim (where m ∈ N may depend on i), where
each sequence a¯i (or b¯i) contains at least two distinct elements, unless the structure Mi
(respectively, Ni) has only one element. Whenever
(Mi, a¯i) ≡
n
FO(TC1) (Ni, b¯i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
2There is no need to consider the case where a¯′, A¯′ is empty, because if a set is parametrically definable
using no parameter, it is also definable using parameters.
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then also
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k ≡
n
FO(TC1)
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k.
Proof. We define a winning strategy for Duplicator in the game
EFnFO(TC1)((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k))
out of her winning strategies in the games EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)) by induction on n.
Base step: n = 0, doing nothing is a strategy for Duplicator. We need to show that
the
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k and
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k agree on all atomic formulas. Now in
the fusion structures, each atomic formula is defined by f in terms of a σ∗-quantifier free
formula that is evaluated in the corresponding disjoint union structure. So it is enough to
show that the disjoint union structures agree on all atomic σ∗-formulas and on their Boolean
combinations. The initial match between the distinguished objects in (Mi, a¯i) and (Ni, b¯i)
is a partial isomorphism for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, so it is also one for
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k and⊎
1≤i≤k Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k i.e. the two disjoint union structures agree on all σ
∗-atomic formulas.
Now relying on the semantics of Boolean connectives, it can be shown by induction on the
complexity of quantifier free sentences that they also agree on all Boolean combinations of
atomic σ∗-sentences.
Inductive step: the inductive hypothesis says that whenever Duplicator has a win-
ning strategy in the game EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)) for some (Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i) satisfy-
ing the required conditions on parameters and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, he also has one in the game
EFnFO(TC1)((
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k), (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k)).
We want to show that this also holds whenever the length of the game is n + 1.
Suppose Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We describe Duplicator’s answer to Spoiler’s first move in the game
EFn+1FO(TC1)((
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k), (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k)). It will then follow by induc-
tion hypothesis, that he has a winning strategy in the remaining n-length game.
• Spoiler’s first move is an ∃ move. Let Spoiler choose a point a ∈ dom(
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi),
then a ∈ dom(Mi) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. So Duplicator can use his winning strategy
in EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)) and pick a corresponding point b in the other structure.
Now he still has a winning strategy in EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a), (Ni, b¯i, b)). So by induction
hypothesis he also has one in the remaining n length game
EFnFO(TC1)((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b)).
• Spoiler’s first move is a TC move. Suppose Spoiler chooses a set A in the set of admissible
subsets of
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi. Then A is necessarily of the form A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ak, with Ai an
admissible subset (possibly empty) of Mi. Her response B = B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bk can now be
defined locally for each Bi using her winning strategies in the small structures. So let
Spoiler choose A = A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ak. Keeping in mind that each non single point small
structure comes with at least two distinct parameters, there are four cases:
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a) in dom(Mi), there is a distinguished object inside, but also outside Ai, so Duplicator
considers Ai together with these two parameters and constructs Bi by using his winning
strategy in EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)).
b) in dom(Mi), only distinguished objects exist inside Ai
3, so Duplicator considers any
one of these distinguished objects, say aj, and looks at Ai\{aj} together with some pa-
rameter inside Ai. Then he can use his winning strategy in EF
n+1
FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i))
to construct an answer that we call B′i. Now Bi = B
′
i ∪ {bj};
c) in dom(Mi), only distinguished objects exist outside Ai,
4 so Duplicator similarly con-
siders some distinguished object aj and looks at Ai ∪ {aj} together with some other
parameter outside Ai, so that he can construct an answer that we call B
′
i by using his
winning strategy in EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)). Now Bi = B
′
i\{bj};
d) Mi is a single point structure, then Bi = ∅ if Ai = ∅ and Bi = dom(Mi) if Ai =
dom(Ni).
Once B = B1 ∪ . . .∪Bk has been constructed, Spoiler picks two points b ∈ B and b
′ /∈ B.
There are two cases:
1. b and b′ belong to the domain of one and the same small structure Ni ; now dom(Mi)
is as previously described in a), b), c) (but not d)), because two distinct points cannot
belong to one and the same single point structure) and in each case Duplicator does
the following:
a) He uses his winning strategy in the game EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)) to answer with
a, a′, so that he still has a winning strategy in EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a, a
′), (Ni, b¯i, b, b
′)).
By induction hypothesis he also has one in the remaining n length game
EFnFO(TC1)((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a, a
′), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b, b
′)).
b) Suppose initially that b′ 6= bj. Now Duplicator considers Ai\{aj} together with aj
and some other parameter inside this set. Then he uses his winning strategy in
EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)) to pick corresponding a, a
′ in Mi, so that he still has a
winning strategy in EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a, a
′), (Ni, b¯i, b, b
′)). By induction hypothesis
he also has one in the remaining n length game
EFnFO(TC1)((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a, a
′), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b, b
′));
Next, suppose b = bj. Then we choose a = aj . The parameter aj already matches
b i.e., Duplicator has a winning strategy in
EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a), (Ni, b¯i, b))
that he may use to pick a′, thus answering as if it was a point move (i.e., a′ has
to be n-equivalent to b′). Therefore Duplicator still has a winning strategy in
EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a, a
′), (Ni, b¯i, b, b
′)). By induction hypothesis he also has one in
3Note that as a special case we may have Ai = dom(Mi).
4Note that as a special case we may have Ai = ∅.
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the remaining n length game
EFnFO(TC1)((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a, a
′), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b, b
′)).
This works, except that there is the additional condition a′ /∈ Ai that Duplicator
must also maintain in order to respect the rules of the game. A slightly more refined
argument shows, however that there has to be an n-equivalent point to b′ which is
outside Ai. Indeed, instead of b, Spoiler could have picked any other point b
∗ ∈ Bi
together with b′ /∈ Bi and Duplicator’s winning strategy would have provided a
correct answer a∗ ∈ Ai, a
′ /∈ Ai, which means that Duplicator would have found
some point a′ which is at least n-equivalent to b′ and lies outside Ai (because if
Duplicator has a winning strategy in EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a
∗, a′), (Ni, b¯i, b
∗, b′)) then
he has one in EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a
′), (Ni, b¯i, b
′)) as well, and consequently also in
EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a, a
′), (Ni, b¯i, b, b
′))).
c) Suppose initially that b 6= bj. Then Duplicator considers Ai ∪ {aj} together
with aj and with some other parameter outside this set and uses his winning
strategy in EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)), so that he still has a winning strategy in
EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a, a
′), (Ni, b¯i, b, b
′)). By induction hypothesis he also has one in
the remaining n length game
EFnFO(TC1)((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a, a
′), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b, b
′));
otherwise b′ = bj, then a
′ = aj because the parameter aj already matches b
′ i.e.,
Duplicator has a winning strategy in
EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a
′), (Ni, b¯i, b
′)),
so we can show by a similar argument as above that he can use it to pick a ∈ Ai,
so that he still has a winning strategy in EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a, a
′), (Ni, b¯i, b, b
′)). By
induction hypothesis he also has one in the remaining n length game
EFnFO(TC1)((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a, a
′), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b, b
′)).
2. otherwise b ∈ dom(Ni, b¯i) and b
′ ∈ dom(Nj , b¯j) with i 6= j; we can again use a similar
argument to show that Duplicator can use his winning strategy in
EFn+1FO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i), (Ni, b¯i)) and EF
n+1
FO(TC1)((Mj , a¯j), (Nj , b¯j))
to pick a, a′ in the right part of the structure (that is, inside or outside Ai), so that
he still has a winning strategy in the games
EFnFO(TC1)((Mi, a¯i, a), (Ni, b¯i, b)) and EF
n
FO(TC1)((Mj , a¯j , a
′), (Nj , b¯j , b
′)) (in the special
case where for instance, Mj is a single point structure, Duplicator picks the only
available point in the other structure). By induction hypothesis he also has one in the
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remaining n length game
EFnFO(TC1)((
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a, a
′), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b, b
′)).
We now show a corollary of the preceding lemma, in which the small structures do not come
with any distinguished objects:
Corollary 5.28. WheneverMi ≡
n
FO(TC1) Ni for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then also
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi ≡
n
FO(TC1)⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni.
Proof. We know that Spoiler’s first two moves in the FO(TC1)-game of length n+1 between⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi and
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni must be quantifier moves, because the TC move can only be
played once there are two pebbles on the board. Let us look at the first move. Suppose
Spoiler plays a point a ∈ dom(
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi). So a ∈ dom(Mi) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By Du-
plicator’s winning strategy in EFnFO(TC1)(Mi,Ni), he has an answer b ∈ dom(Ni) such that
(Mi, a) ≡
n
FO(TC1) (Ni, b). Let us rename a with ai1 and b with bi1 . Similarly, for every j 6= i
such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k, fix some random point aj1 coming from the domain ofMj , Spoiler could
have played this point and so Duplicator would have had an adequate answer bj1 such that
(Mj , aj1) ≡
n
FO(TC1) (Nj , bj1). Now for the second round in the game, some point a
′ = al2 or
b′ = bl2 coming from the domain of respectively Ml or Nl will be played by Spoiler and Du-
plicator will be able to answer so that (Ml, al1 , al2) ≡
n−2
FO(TC1) (Nl, bl1 , bl2). Similarly, for each
Mj such that j 6= l, we can find points such that (Mj , aj1 , aj2) ≡
n−2
FO(TC1) (Ni, bj1 , bj2). Now as
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Duplicator has a winning strategy in EFn−2FO(TC1)((Mi, ai1 , ai2), (Ni, bi1 , bi2)),
by the previous lemma, he has one in
EFn−2FO(TC1)(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, a11 , a12 , . . . , ak1 , ak2), (
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, b11 , b12 , . . . , bk1 , bk2)),
so he also has one in EFn−2FO(TC1)(
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, a, a
′), (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, b, b
′)).
Corollary 5.29. Whenever Mi ≡
n
FO(TC1) Ni for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then it also holds that⊎
1≤i≤k Mi ≡
n
FO(TC1)
⊎
1≤i≤k Ni.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.24.
Corollary 5.30. A⊕f
1≤i≤k
Mi
is closed under FO(TC1) parametric definability and so the
structure
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi is a FO(TC1)-Henkin structure.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.25.
Corollary 5.31. A⊎
1≤i≤k Mi
is closed under FO(TC1) parametric definability and so the
structure
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi is a FO(TC1)-Henkin structure.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.26.
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In the FO(LFP1) case, the situation parallels the FO(TC1) case. As LFP moves can
only be played when there is already one pebble on the board, it is more convenient to show
first a version of our FO(LFP1) fusion theorem in which each small structure comes with
at least one FO parameter. This allows us to define Duplicator’s answer to a LFP move
played in the big structure, by means of his winning strategies in the small structures. We
then derive as a corollary the fusion theorem for non-parametrized structures.
Theorem 5.32 (Fusion Theorem for FO(LFP1)). Let a¯i, b¯i be non empty sequences of first-
order parameters of the form ai1 , . . . , aim , bi1 , . . . , bim , with m ∈ N and A¯i, B¯i sequences of
set parameters of the form Ai1 , . . . , Aim′ , Bi1 , . . . , Bim′ with m
′ ∈ N. Whenever
(Mi, A¯i, a¯i) ≡
n
FO(LFP1) (Ni, B¯i, b¯i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
then also
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k ≡
n
FO(LFP1)
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k.
Proof. We proceed by induction on n, defining a winning strategy for Duplicator in the game
EFnFO(LFP1)((
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k), (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k)),
out of her winning strategies in the games EFnFO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)).
Base step: n = 0, doing nothing is a strategy for Duplicator (this can be justified by a
similar argument as in the MSO case).
Inductive step: the inductive hypothesis says that whenever Duplicator has a winning
strategy in EFnFO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)) for pairs of structures (Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)
satisfying the required conditions on parameters with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, he also has one in
EFnFO(LFP1)((
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k), (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k)).
We want to show that this also holds when the length of the games is n+1. Suppose Du-
plicator has a winning strategy in EFn+1FO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We
describe Duplicator’s answer to Spoiler’s first move in the FO(LFP1)-game of length n+1 in
between (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, (A¯1, . . . , A¯k)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k) and (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, (B¯1, . . . , B¯k)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k).
It then follows by induction hypothesis, that he has a winning strategy in the remaining
n-length game.
• Spoiler’s first move is an ∃ move.
Same argument as for MSO and FO(TC1).
• Spoiler’s first move is a ∀ move.
Symmetric.
• Spoiler’s first move is a GFP move.
Suppose Spoiler chooses a set A in the set of admissible subsets of
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi with
some pebble aij ∈ A. Then A is necessarily of the form A1∪. . .∪Ak, with Ai an admissible
subset of Mi. Her response B = B1∪ . . .∪Bk can now be defined locally for each Bi using
her winning strategies in the small structures. So let Spoiler choose A = A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ak.
Keeping in mind that each small structure comes with at least one parameter, there are
four cases:
1) in dom(Mi), there is a distinguished object inside Ai and Ai 6= dom(Mi), so Duplicator
considers Ai together with this parameter and constructs Bi by using his winning
strategy in EFn+1FO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)).
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2) in dom(Mi), there are only distinguished objects outside Ai 6= ∅, so Duplicator con-
siders any aj among those and looks at Ai ∪ {aj}, so that he can use his winning
strategy in EFn+1FO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i)) to construct an answer that we call
B′i. Now Bi = B
′
i\{bj}. This is a correct answer, because the (posimorphism) condi-
tion to be maintained (see Definition 5.20) is that for every pebble al on the board
at the end of the game, al ∈ Ai ⇒ bl ∈ Bi. But by Duplicator’s winning strategy in
EFn+1FO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, Ai∪{aj}, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, B
′
i, b¯i)), we know already that for every such
pebble, al ∈ Ai ∪ {aj} ⇒ bl ∈ B
′
i, so also al ∈ Ai ⇒ bl ∈ B
′
i\{bj}, since the winning
conditions will assure that al = aj if and only if bl = bj .
3) Bi = dom(Mi). So Ai = dom(Ni). As pebbles are only chosen using Duplicator’s
winning strategies in the small structures, the posimorphism condition will be main-
tained.
4) Bi = ∅. So Ai = ∅. As no pebble can belong to this set, the posimorphism condition
will be maintained.
Now that B = B1∪. . .∪Bk has been constructed, Spoiler picks a new element b ∈ B which
belongs to the domain of one particular small structure Ni (so b ∈ Bi) and dom(Mi) is
as previously described either in 1, 2 or 3 (but not 4), because b cannot belong to the
empty set) and in each case Duplicator does the following:
1) Duplicator answers with a according to his winning strategy in
EFn+1FO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, b¯i));
2) Duplicator again considers Ai ∪{aj} and answers according to his winning strategy in
EFn+1FO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, Ai ∪ {aj}, a¯i), (Ni, B¯i, B
′
i, b¯i)). This is safe, because the pebble to
be chosen may be assumed to be fresh, so it won’t be aj ;
3) Duplicator picks a random pebble aj ∈ dom(Mi) and considers dom(Mi)\{aj}. His
winning strategy provides him with a correct answer.
So in any of these cases (either 1, 2 or 3), Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game
EFnFO(LFP1)((Mi, A¯i, Ai, a¯i, a), (Ni, B¯i, Bi, b¯i, b)). Now for all j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, he also has
one in EFnFO(LFP1)((Mj , A¯j , Aj , a¯j), (Nj , B¯j , Bj , b¯j)). So by induction hypothesis, he has
one in the remaining n-length FO(LFP1) game between the following two structures:
(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Mi, (A¯1, A1, . . . , A¯k, Ak)
∪, a¯1, . . . , a¯k, a)
and
(
f⊕
1≤i≤k
Ni, (B¯1, B1, . . . , B¯k, Bk)
∪, b¯1, . . . , b¯k, b)
• Spoiler’s first move is a LFP move.
Symmetric.
Corollary 5.33. Whenever Mi ≡
n
FO(LFP1) Ni for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then it also holds that⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi ≡
n
FO(LFP1)
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni.
Proof. We know that Spoiler’s first move in EFn+1FO(LFP1)(
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi,
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni) must be a
FO quantifier move, because the LFP move can only be played once there is a pebble on the
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board. Let us look at the first move. Suppose Spoiler plays a point a ∈ dom(
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi). So
a ∈ dom(Mi) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By Duplicator’s winning strategy in EF
n
FO(LFP1)(Mi,Ni),
he has an answer b ∈ dom(Ni) such that (Mi, a) ≡
n
FO(LFP1) (Ni, b). Let us rename a with
ai and b with bi. Similarly, for every j 6= i such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k, fix some random point
aj coming from the domain of Mj , Spoiler could have played this point and so Duplicator
would have had an adequate answer bj such that (Mj , aj) ≡
n
FO(LFP1) (Nj , bj). Now as for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Duplicator has a winning strategy in EFn−1FO(LFP1)((Mi, ai), (Ni, bi)), by the
previous lemma, he has one in EFn−1FO(LFP1)(
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, a1, . . . , ak), (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, b1, . . . , bk)),
so he also has one in EFn−1FO(LFP1)(
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi, a), (
⊕f
1≤i≤k Ni, b)).
Corollary 5.34. Whenever Mi ≡
n
FO(LFP1) Ni for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then it also holds that⊎
1≤i≤k Mi ≡
n
FO(LFP1)
⊎
1≤i≤k Ni.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.24.
Corollary 5.35. A⊕f
1≤i≤k
is closed under FO(LFP1) parametric definability and so the
structure
⊕f
1≤i≤k Mi is a FO(LFP1)-Henkin structure.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.25.
Corollary 5.36. A⊎
1≤i≤k Mi
is closed under FO(LFP1) parametric definability and so the
structure
⊎
1≤i≤k Mi is a FO(LFP1)-Henkin structure.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.26.
6. Putting it Together: Completeness on Finite Trees
6.1. Forests and Operations on Forests. In Section 6.2, we will prove that no Λ-
sentence can distinguish Λ-Henkin-models of ⊢treeΛ from standard models of ⊢
tree
Λ . More
precisely, we will show that for each n, every definably well-founded Λ-quasi-tree is n-Λ-
equivalent to a finite tree. In order to give an inductive proof, it will be more convenient
to consider a stronger version of this result concerning a class of finite and infinite Henkin
structures that we call quasi-forests. In this section, we give the definition of quasi-forest
and we show how they can be combined into bigger quasi-forests using the notion of fusion
from Section 5. Whenever quasi forests are finite, we simply call them finite forests. As a
simple example, consider a finite tree and remove the root node, then it is no longer a finite
tree. Instead it is a finite sequence of trees, whose roots stand in a linear (sibling) order.5 It
does not have a unique root, but it does have a unique left-most root. For technical reasons
it will be convenient in the definition of quasi forests to add an extra monadic predicate R
labeling the roots.
Definition 6.1 (Λ-quasi-forest). Let T = (dom(T ), <,≺, P1, . . . , . . . Pn,AT ) be a Λ-quasi-
tree. Given a node a in T , consider the Λ-substructure of T generated by the set {x | ∃z(a 
z ∧ z ≤ x)}, which is the set formed by a together with all its siblings to the right and their
5Note that, as far as roots are concerned, two nodes can be siblings without sharing any parent. This
would not happen in a quasi tree.
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descendants. The Λ-quasi-forest Ta is obtained by labeling each root in this substructure
with R (Rx⇔def ¬∃y y < x). Whenever T is a tree, we simply call Ta a forest.
We will show in our main proof of completeness that for each n and for each node a
in a definably well-founded Λ-quasi-tree, the Λ-quasi-forest Ta is n-Λ-equivalent to a finite
forest. Our proof will use a notion of composition of Λ-quasi-forests which is a special case
of fusion. Given a single node forest F1 and two Λ-quasi-forests F2 and F3, we construct
a new Λ-quasi-forest
⊕f△(F1, F2, F3) by letting the unique element in F1 be the left-most
root, the roots of F2 become the children of this node and the roots of F3 become its
siblings to the right. We then derive a corollary of the Λ-fusion theorem for compositions
of Λ-quasi-forests and use it in Section 6.2.
Definition 6.2. Let σ = {<,≺, R, P1, . . . , Pn}, be a relational vocabulary with only monadic
predicates except < and ≺. Given three additional monadic predicates Q1, Q2, Q3, we define
a mapping f△ from σ to quantifier-free formulas over σ ∪ {Q1, Q2, Q3} by letting
• f△(Pi) = Pi(x1)
• f△(<) = x1 < x2 ∨ (Q1(x1) ∧Q2(x2))
• f△(≺) = x1 ≺ x2 ∨ (Q1(x1) ∧Q3(x2) ∧R(x2))
• f△(R) = (Q3(x1) ∧R(x1)) ∨Q1(x1)
Corollary 6.3. Let F1 be a single node forest and F2, F3 Λ-quasi forests. If F2 ≡
n
Λ F
′
2 and
F3 ≡
n
Λ F
′
3 then
⊕f△(F1, F2, F3) ≡nΛ
⊕f△(F1, F ′2, F ′3).
F1
F2
F3
Figure 6: A composition of forests using the mapping f△
Figure 6 represents a composition of three forests F1, F2, F3 which uses the mapping
f△. Only new <ch-arrows are represented, linking the unique node in F1 to the root nodes
in F2. But new -links have also been added and the roots in F3 have became the siblings
to the right of the root in F1. This is implicitly indicated by the left to right organization
of the picture.
6.2. Main Proof of Completeness.
Lemma 6.4. For all n ∈ N, every definably well-founded Λ-quasi-tree of finite signature is
n-Λ-equivalent to a finite tree. In particular, a Λ-sentence is valid on definably well-founded
Λ-quasi-trees iff it is valid on finite trees.
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Proof. Let T be a Λ-quasi-tree, without loss of generality assume that a monadic predicate
R labels its root (and only that node in the tree). During this proof, it will be convenient
to work with Λ-quasi-forests. Note that finite Λ-quasi-forests are simply finite forests and
finite Λ-quasi-trees are simply finite trees (cf. Proposition 3.1 for the case of quasi-trees,
from which the case for quasi-forests follows immediately). Let Xn be the set of all nodes
a of T for which it holds that Ta is n-Λ-equivalent to a finite forest. We first show that
‘belonging to Xn” is a property definable in T (Claim 1). We then use the induction scheme
to show that every node of a definably well-founded Λ-quasi-tree (so in particular, the root)
has this property (Claim 2).
Claim 1: Xn is invariant for n+1-Λ-equivalence (i.e., (T, a) ≡
Λ
n+1 (T, b) implies that a ∈ Xn
iff b ∈ Xn), and hence is defined by a Λ-formula of quantifier depth n+ 1.
Proof of claim. Suppose that (T, a) ≡Λn+1 (T, b). We will show that Ta ≡
Λ
n Tb, and hence,
by the definition of Xn, a ∈ Xn iff b ∈ Xn. By the definition of Λ-quasi-forests, dom(Ta) =
{x | ∃z(a  z ∧ z ≤ x)}. Let ϕ be any Λ-sentence of quantifier depth n. We can assume
without loss of generality that ϕ does not contain the variables z and x (otherwise we can
rename in ϕ these two variables). By lemma 5.4, (T, a) |= REL(ϕ,∃z(a  z ∧ z ≤ x), x) iff
Ta |= ϕ. Notice that REL(ϕ,∃z(a  z∧ z ≤ x), x) expresses precisely that ϕ holds in (T, a)
within the subforest Ta. Moreover, the quantifier depth of REL(ϕ,∃z(a  z ∧ z ≤ x) is at
most n+1. It follows that (T, a) |= REL(ϕ,∃z(a  z∧z ≤ x), x) iff (T, b) |= REL(ϕ,∃z(b 
z ∧ z ≤ x), x), and hence Ta |= ϕ iff Tb |= ϕ.
For the second part of the claim, note that by Lemma 5.11, up to logical equivalence,
there are only finitely many Λ-formulas of any given quantifier depth, as the vocabulary is
finite. ⊣
Claim 2: If all descendants and siblings to the right of a belong to Xn, then a itself belongs
to Xn.
Proof of claim. Let us consider the case where a has both a descendant and a following
sibling (all other cases are simpler). Then, by axioms T3, T5, T8, T9 and T10, a has a first
child b, and an immediate next sibling c. Moreover, we know that both b and c are in Xn.
In other words, Tb and Tc are n-Λ-equivalent to finite forests T
′
b and T
′
c. Now, we construct
a finite Λ-quasi-forest T ′a by taking a f
△-fusion of T ′b, T
′
c and of the Λ-substructure of T
generated by {a}, whose unique element becomes a common parent of all roots of T ′b and a
left sibling of all roots of T ′c. So we get T
′
a =
⊕f△(T ↾ {a}, T ′b, T ′c)). It is not hard to see that
T ′a is again a finite forest. Moreover, by the fusion theorem,
⊕f△(T ↾ {a}, Tb, Tc)) ≡Λn T ′a.
Now to show that
⊕f△(T ↾ {a}, Tb, Tc)) is isomorphic to Ta (which entails Ta ≡Λn T ′a i.e.
Ta is n-Λ-equivalent to a finite forest), it is enough to show ATa = A⊕f△(T ↾{a},Tb,Tc)
. It
holds that A⊕f△ (T ↾{a},Tb,Tc)
⊆ ATa because we can define in Ta each such union of sets by
means of a disjunction. Now to show ATa ⊆ A⊕f△(T ↾{a},Tb,Tc)
, take A ∈ ATa , so A = X∩Ta
for some X ⊆ AT . As dom(T ↾ {a}), dom(Tb) and dom(Tc) are all definable in T , the
intersection of each of these sets with A is also definable in T and hence A ∩ dom(T ↾ {a})
is definable in dom(T ↾ {a}), A ∩ dom(Tb) is definable in Tb and A ∩ dom(Tc) is definable
in Tc. But then A, which can be formed as the union of these three sets, is also definable
in A⊕f△(T ↾{a},Tb,Tc)
.
⊣
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It follows from these two claims, by the induction scheme for definable properties, that
Xn contains all nodes of the Λ-quasi-tree, including the root, and hence T is n-Λ-equivalent
to a finite tree (to a finite forest actually, but the root of the Λ-quasi-tree being labeled by
R, it can also be viewed as a Λ-quasi-forest). For the second statement of the lemma, it
suffices to note that every Λ-sentence has a finite vocabulary and a finite quantifier depth.
Theorem 6.5. Let Λ ∈ {MSO,FO(TC1),FO(LFP1)}. The Λ-theory of finite trees is com-
pletely axiomatized by ⊢treeΛ .
Proof. Theorem 6.5 follows directly from Lemma 6.4 and Corollary 4.18.
6.3. Definability of the Class of Finite Trees. Proposition 6.6 below shows together
with Theorem 6.5 that on standard structures, the set of ⊢treeΛ consequences actually defines
the (not FO-definable) class of finite trees. That is, ⊢treeΛ has no infinite standard model at
all.
Proposition 6.6 ([22]). Let Λ ∈ {FO(TC1),FO(LFP1),MSO}. On standard structures,
there is a Λ-formula which defines the class of finite trees.
Sketch of the proof. It is enough to show it for Λ = FO(TC1). It follows by Section 2.3 that
it also holds for MSO and FO(LFP1). We merely give a sketch of the proof. For additional
details we refer the reader to [22].
Recall from Proposition 3.1 that, on finite standard structures, the finite conjunction
of the axioms T1–T10 in Figure 5 defines the class of finite trees, i.e., any finite structure
satisfying this conjunction is a finite tree. Now we will explain how to construct another
sentence, which together with this one, actually defines on arbitrary standard structures
the class of finite trees. Let L be a shorthand for the formula labeling the leaves in the
tree (Lx ⇔def ¬∃y x < y) and R a shorthand for the formula labeling the root (Rx ⇔def
¬∃y y < x). Consider the depth-first left-to-right ordering of nodes in a tree and the
FO(TC1) formula ϕ(x, y) saying “the node that comes after x in this ordering is y”:
ϕ(x, y) :≈ (¬Lx ∧ x <ch y ∧ ¬∃zz ≺ y) ∨ (Lx ∧ x ≺ns y) ∨ (Lx ∧ ¬∃zx ≺ z ∧ ∃z(z <
x ∧ z ≺ns y ∧ ¬∃ww < x ∧ z < w ∧ ∃uw ≺ns u))
There is also a FO(TC1) formula which says that “x is the very last node in this ordering”.
ϕ(x, y) can be combined with this formula into an FO(TC1) formula χ expressing that the
tree is finite by saying that (we rely here for the interpretation of χ on the alternative
semantics for the TC operator given in Proposition 2.4) “there is a finite sequence of nodes
x1 . . . xn such that x1 is the root, xi+1 the node that comes after xi in the above ordering,
for all i, and xn is the very last node of the tree in the above ordering”.
χ :≈ ∃u∃z(Rz ∧ [TCxyϕ](z, u) ∧ ¬∃u
′(u 6= u′ ∧ [TCxyϕ](u, u
′)))
Theorem 6.7. For Λ ∈ {MSO,FO(TC1),FO(LFP1)}, the set of axioms T1–T10 together
with all Λ-instances of the induction scheme Ind defines the class of finite trees.
Proof. By Proposition 6.6 we can express in Λ by means of some formula χ that a structure
is a finite tree. So χ is provable in ⊢treeΛ (as it is a Λ-formula valid on the class of finite
trees). In other words, if Γ is the set of axioms T1–T10 together with all Λ-instances of the
induction scheme Ind, then we have that Γ ⊢Λ χ.
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7. Finite Linear Orders
Let us note that a simplified version of this method can be used in order to show the
completeness of MSO, FO(TC1) and FO(LFP1) on finite node-labeled linear orders (i.e.,
finite node-labeled trees in which every node has at most one child). The relevant simpler
axioms are the ones listed in Figures 1, 7 and respectively, Figures 2, 3 and 4.
L1. ∀xyz(x < y ∧ y < z → x < z) < is transitive
L2. ¬∃x(x < x) < is irreflexive
L3. ∀xy(x < y → ∃z(x <ch z ∧ z ≤ y)) immediate children
L4. ∃x∀y¬(y < x) there is a root
L5. ∀xy(x = y ∨ x < y ∨ y < x) < is total
Ind. ∀x(∀y((x < y → ϕ(y))→ ϕ(x))→ ∀xϕ(x)
where
ϕ(x) ranges over Λ-formulas in one free variable x
and
x <ch y is shorthand for x < y ∧ ¬∃z(z < y ∧ x < z)
Figure 7: Specific axioms on finite linear orders
8. Conclusion
In this paper, taking inspiration from Kees Doets [12] we developed a uniform method for
obtaining complete axiomatizations of fragments of MSO on finite trees. For that purpose,
we had to adapt classical tools and notions from finite model theory to the specificities of
Henkin semantics. The presence of admissible subsets called for some refinements in model
theoretic constructions such as formation of substructure or disjoint union. Also, we noticed
that not every Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game that has been used for FO(TC1) was suitable to
use on Henkin-structures. We focused on a game which does not seem to have been used
previously in the literature. We also established analogues of the FO Feferman-Vaught
theorem for MSO, FO(TC1) and FO(LFP1) on Henkin-structures (let us recall that related
work for the case of standard structures can be found in [25]). We considered fusions, a
particular case of the Feferman-Vaught notion of generalized product and obtained results
for Henkin-structures which might be interesting to generalize and use in other contexts.
We applied our method to MSO, FO(TC1) and FO(LFP1), but it would be worth also
examining other fragments of MSO or logics such as monadic deterministic transitive clo-
sure logic (FO(DTC1), which was advocated in [30] as particularly relevant in the context
of applications to model-theoretic syntax) or monadic alternating transitive closure logic
(FO(ATC1)), see also [6].
An important feature of our main completeness argument (the idea of which was bor-
rowed from Kees Doets) is the way we used the inductive scheme of Figure 5. Hence,
extending our approach to another class of finite structures would involve finding a com-
parable scheme. We also know that we should focus on a logic which is decidable on this
class, as on finite structures recursive enumerability is equivalent to decidability (as long
as the model-checking is decidable). This suggests that other natural candidates would be
fragments of MSO on classes of finite structures with bounded treewidth.
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Finally, let us notice that MSO is also known to be decidable over infinite trees and
over linear orders of order type ω. It would be interesting to look for a model-theoretic
argument which would work on a Henkin model and produce an intended model of one of
these theories in a way comparable to what we did here or to what Keisler did in [20]. Note
that related complete axiomatizations of monadic theories of classes of infinite structures
can be found in [5], [29] and [31], but that instead of relying on Henkin-semantics, the
completeness proofs there are based on automata-theoretic techniques.
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